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Protected by Association?
The Supreme Court’s Incomplete Approach to
Defining the Scope of the Third-Party
Retaliation Doctrine
Jessica K. Fink*
For decades, courts have struggled with how to treat claims of “third-party retaliation”—
situations where one employee engages in some protected activity for purposes of Title
VII but where the employer retaliates not against that employee, but rather against one of
her coworkers—her spouse, or sibling, or mere workplace acquaintance. With its January
2011 decision in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, the U.S. Supreme Court
finally has weighed in on this issue, deeming employees protected against third-party
retaliation under Title VII.
This Article stands as one of the first in-depth examinations of Thompson and its
potential impact on both employers and employees. While this Article approves of the
Supreme Court’s decision to deem third-party retaliation claims viable under Title VII,
this Article proposes a different framework for analyzing these claims than that applied
by the Supreme Court in Thompson. Specifically, this Article argues that courts should
apply jurisprudence from negligent infliction of emotional distress cases to conduct a
more structured analysis of third-party retaliation claims. In addition, this Article argues
that courts should define the class of plaintiffs who can assert third-party retaliation
claims by requiring that only individuals who have engaged in some protected activity can
sue. Other employees affected by employer retaliation—those who receive adverse
treatment from their employer, but who did not themselves engage in any protected
activity—should not be permitted to bring third-party retaliation claims. In articulating
this framework, this Article seeks to strike a balance between deterring employers from
engaging in retaliatory behavior and avoiding the negative consequences that could result
from failing to place reasonable limits on the third-party retaliation doctrine.

* Associate Professor, California Western School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 2001; B.A.,
University of Michigan, 1997. I presented an earlier version of this Article as part of the Southeastern
Association of Law Schools’ New Scholars Program, and I am grateful to the conference participants,
including my conference mentor Jeffrey Hirsch, for their feedback regarding this Article. I also am
indebted to Ruben Garcia for his encouragement and input, and to Orly Lobel and the students in her
Work, Welfare and Justice Seminar at the University of San Diego School of Law for their helpful
suggestions. Finally, many thanks to Candis Ferguson for her excellent research assistance.
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Introduction
For some time, one of the most perplexing areas of
antidiscrimination law has involved how courts should treat claims of
“third-party retaliation”—situations where one employee engages in
some protected activity and the employer takes adverse action not
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against that employee, but rather against one of her coworkers. For
example, an employee files a discrimination charge against her employer,
and the employer seeks to retaliate against the employee for filing this
charge. However, instead of taking adverse action against the employee,
the employer takes action against one of her coworkers—her spouse, or
sibling, or perhaps a mere workplace friend. For many years, the courts
reached varying conclusions regarding the extent to which Title VII of
1
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 should bar this type of third-party
retaliation. On the one hand, some courts emphasized the importance of
providing robust safeguards against discrimination and retaliation in the
workplace, including by enacting broad protections with respect to
employers retaliating against employees who opposed workplace
2
discrimination. On the other hand, some courts expressed concerns
about creating a slippery slope of liability for employers, whereby every
time an employee complained of workplace discrimination, the employer
would be exposed to liability not only for subsequent actions taken
against that employee, but also for actions taken against anyone in the
3
workplace associated with that employee.
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court has weighed in on this issue. In its
recent decision in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, the Court
unanimously held that Title VII bars employers from engaging in third4
party retaliation. In so doing, the Court took an important step toward
resolving long-standing ambiguity with respect to the scope of Title VII’s
retaliation provision. Yet while the Court’s decision in Thompson made
clear that at least some third-party retaliation claims will be viable, it
ultimately failed to sufficiently define the scope of the third-party
retaliation doctrine, both with respect to the types of claims that should
be recognized by the courts and with respect to who should be able to
bring these types of claims.
This Article examines the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Thompson, analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the Court’s
position and proposing a different framework for analyzing third-party
retaliation claims. Specifically, while this Article agrees with the Court’s
decision to deem third-party retaliation claims viable (at least in some
circumstances), it asserts that the Court did not go far enough in
articulating the outer boundaries of this doctrine. In that vein, this
Article makes two suggestions for further establishing the parameters of
the third-party retaliation doctrine. First, this Article suggests that courts
should analyze third-party retaliation claims through a framework
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2010), amended by Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)
(2010) [hereinafter Title VII].
2. See infra notes 30–34 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 26–28 and accompanying text.
4. 131 S. Ct. 863, 870 (2011).
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applied in cases alleging negligent infliction of emotional distress
(“NIED”). As discussed further below, many of the same concerns that
arise in a NIED context—regarding frivolous claims and excessive
liability—also emerge in cases involving third-party retaliation. Thus, the
same factors that courts use to define the scope of the NIED doctrine
also can be applied to claims alleging third-party retaliation. Second, this
Article argues that courts should limit which parties can instigate a thirdparty retaliation claim by holding that only individuals who engage in
some protected activity should be permitted to sue. Other employees
affected by employer retaliation—those who receive adverse treatment
from their employer but who did not themselves engage in any protected
activity—should not be permitted to bring a third-party retaliation claim.
Part I of this Article provides background regarding the third-party
retaliation doctrine, describing how various courts—including, most
recently, the Supreme Court—have treated cases asserting this cause of
action. Part II expands upon the above-mentioned suggestions for
defining the scope of the third-party retaliation doctrine, first explaining
how courts could apply a NIED analysis to these claims, and then
explaining why only individuals who personally have engaged in
protected activity should be permitted to serve as plaintiffs in these cases.
Part III anticipates and responds to potential objections to these
proposed changes to the third-party retaliation framework, focusing in
particular on the suggestion that only individuals who have engaged in
protected activity can sue. Finally, the Conclusion provides some
thoughts regarding the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Thompson, including the Court’s failure to establish firmer limits on the
scope of the third-party retaliation doctrine.

I. What Is “Third Party Retaliation” Under Title VII?
5
In enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress
created sweeping protections for employees against workplace
discrimination. In addition to prohibiting employers from discriminating
against employees on the basis of race, sex, color, religion, or national
6
origin, Title VII also bars employers from “retaliating” against
7
employees who have exercised certain rights under Title VII.
5.. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. 7, 78 Stat. 241, 253–266 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2010)).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
7. See id. § 2000e-3(a) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”). Some
of the cases cited in this Article deal with retaliation alleged under other federal antidiscrimination
statutes, such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”) or the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). Because the retaliation provisions in the ADEA and ADA are
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Specifically, Title VII’s retaliation provision (found in section 704(a) of
the law) protects two types of activities by employees. First, the
“participation clause” within Title VII’s retaliation provision bars
employers from taking adverse action against employees who “ha[ve]
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner” in the
8
investigation or litigation of any discrimination complaint. Second, the
“opposition clause” of the statute protects employees who have
“opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice” under
9
Title VII. With respect to both of these clauses, the Supreme Court has
observed that the underlying purpose of Title VII’s section 704(a) is to
10
“maintain[] unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” In
this respect, the Supreme Court seems to have recognized that part of
preventing unlawful workplace discrimination in the first place is
ensuring that the potential victims of this conduct have an unimpeded
ability to expose and combat this type of illegal employer behavior.
Employees who fear reprisal for reporting alleged discrimination may
never come forward, thus allowing the unlawful activity to continue.
A. The History of the Third-Party Retaliation Doctrine Prior to
THOMPSON V. NORTH AMERICAN STAINLESS, LP
This retaliation provision within Title VII has taken on greater
significance in recent years. Retaliation claims comprise a rapidly growing
percentage of the total number of Title VII claims filed by individuals.
Indeed, retaliation claims have increased substantially in the past decade,
and now comprise more than one-third of all Equal Employment
11
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) charges. For example, in 1999, the
12
EEOC received 19,694 charges of retaliation, constituting 25.4% of the
virtually identical to that within Title VII, courts generally use precedent under these
antidiscrimination statutes interchangeably. See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., 283 F.3d 561, 567 (3d Cir.
2002).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
9. Id.
10. Alex B. Long, The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right of
Association in the Workplace, 59 Fla. L. Rev. 931, 950 (2007) (omission in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)); see also Deborah L. Brake,
Retaliation, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 18, 55 n.130 (2005); Natalie Watson Winslow, Note, When Just Saying
“No” Is Not Enough: How an Employee Who Rejects a Supervisor’s Sexual Advances May Not Be
Protected from Retaliation—and What the Supreme Court Can Do About It, 46 Cal. W. L. Rev. 211,
215 (2009) (“[T]he purpose of [Title VII’s] anti-retaliation provision is to prevent an employer from
retaliating against an employee who seeks to enforce the guarantees of the Act.”).
11. See Charge Statistics, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm
(2011) (last visited Dec. 23, 2011) [hereinafter EEOC, Charge Statistics]; see also Long, supra note 10,
at 935; Carrie B. Temm, Comment, Third-Party Retaliation Claims: Where to Draw the Line, 54 U.
Kan. L. Rev. 865, 867 (2006) (“While the total number of Title VII charges has not shown a recent
growth trend, Title VII retaliation charges have doubled in the past ten years.”(footnote omitted)). It
is unclear what percentage of these retaliation charges involve claims of third-party retaliation.
12. EEOC, Charge Statistics, supra note 11. The “total retaliation charges” described in this Part
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total charges received by the agency. A mere decade later, in 2009, the
EEOC received 33,613 charges of retaliation, comprising 36% of the
14
total charges received.
In most cases, a plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie case of
retaliation under Title VII will face a fairly straightforward task. The
plaintiff must show: (1) that she engaged in some “protected activity” for
purposes of Title VII, under either the statute’s “participation” or
“opposition” frameworks; (2) that she suffered some adverse employment
action; and (3) that there is some causal connection between the
15
protected activity and the adverse action. Thus, an employee could
assert a retaliation claim against her employer if the employee was
terminated or denied a promotion because that employee had engaged in
some “protected activity,” perhaps by filing a charge of discrimination or
16
bringing a Title VII lawsuit against her employer. Similarly, an
employee could assert a retaliation claim against her employer if the
employer took adverse action against the employee because the
employee actively supported the discrimination allegations of a coworker,
such as by assisting in an EEOC investigation of the coworker’s
discrimination allegations or by testifying in support of the coworker at
17
her Title VII trial.
Third-party retaliation claims also arise in a different context,
however. Sometimes an employee may not have engaged in any
protected activity of her own: She may not have filed her own charge of
discrimination or have done anything actively to support a coworker’s
allegations of discrimination. However, this employee might receive
adverse action from an employer in the wake of protected activity by a
coworker, due to the employee’s relationship with the coworker who
engaged in protected activity. For example, Joe Senior gets fired because
his son, Joe Junior, filed a discrimination charge against their mutual

refer to charges of retaliation under all relevant statutes: Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, and the
Equal Pay Act of 1963.
13. EEOC, Charge Statistics, supra note 11.
14. Id.; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct.
863 (2011) (No. 09-291) [hereinafter Thompson Oral Argument Transcript] (“According to the EEOC
statistics, in 1992 . . . 14.5 percent of charges filed with the EEOC were retaliation claims. By 2009 that
had risen by 31 percent.”).
15. See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., 283 F.3d 561, 567–68 (3d Cir. 2002); Little v. Windermere
Relocation, Inc., 301 F.3d 958, 969 (9th Cir. 2002).
16. See, e.g., Decker v. Andersen Consulting, 860 F. Supp. 1300, 1306–07 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(allowing a retaliation claim to proceed where the employee presented a genuine issue of material fact
that her employer reduced her responsibilities and terminated her employment in response to her
filing an EEOC charge of discrimination and informing her employer of her intent to pursue a
discrimination claim).
17. Glover v. S.C. Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411 (4th Cir. 1999) (allowing a retaliation
claim to proceed where the plaintiff claimed that her employer discharged her in retaliation for her
testimony against the employer in a gender discrimination suit filed by another employee).
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employer; Wendy Wife is demoted because her spouse and coworker,
Harry Husband, called the EEOC to report workplace discrimination. In
these situations, an employee (the “Target”) receives adverse action
from an employer not because of her own protected activity, but rather
because of the protected activity of some other employee (the “Actor”),
18
with whom this Target has some type of relationship.
Despite suffering from adverse employment action, these Targets of
employer retaliation historically have faced problems in their efforts to
assert Title VII retaliation claims. Neither Joe Senior nor Wendy Wife
personally engaged in any protected activity. While these potential
plaintiffs can demonstrate that they have suffered from some adverse
employment action, satisfying the second prong of the prima facie test,
they may not be able to satisfy the first prong of this test, in that they
themselves have not engaged in the type of active “participation” or
“opposition” contemplated by Title VII’s retaliation provision and may
not be able to show that some protected activity caused the adverse
action they experienced. Accordingly, courts have split regarding
whether to recognize a retaliation claim in this context.
1. Courts Opposed to the Third-Party Retaliation Doctrine
Prior to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Thompson, federal
courts of appeals faced with third-party retaliation claims uniformly had
refused to recognize these claims, deeming them outside the scope of
19
Title VII’s retaliation provision. These courts relied substantially on the
text of Title VII in refusing to recognize third-party retaliation claims.
Title VII’s retaliation provision, section 704(a), provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has
made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
20
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.

Courts interpreting this language had held that the use of the term
“he” within this provision meant that the individual receiving adverse
18. The terms “Actor” and “Target” will be used throughout this Article to describe, respectively,
the individual who engaged in a protected activity for purposes of Title VII and the third party who
received adverse action from her employer as a result of the Actor’s protected activity.
19. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 567 F.3d 804, 811 (6th Cir. 2009) (“In sum, no circuit court
of appeals has held that Title VII creates a claim for third-party retaliation in circumstances where the
plaintiff has not engaged personally in protected activity.”); see also Lawrence L. Lee & Brandon D.
Saxon, The Supreme Court’s 2010 Upcoming Employment Law Docket, Municipal Lawyer, Sept./Oct.
2010, at 24, 26. While the Sixth Circuit seemed to permit consideration of a third-party retaliation
claim in EEOC v. Ohio Edison, 7 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 1993), that same court subsequently characterized
as dicta the relevant portion of that decision and distinguished the facts of that case from those
involved in a true third-party retaliation situation. See Thompson, 567 F.3d at 809.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
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action from an employer must be the same person who engaged in some
21
protected activity. As one court observed, “it is hard to imagine a
clearer way of specifying that the individual who was discriminated
22
against must also be the individual who engaged in protected activity.”
While courts acknowledged that this narrow reading of section 704(a)
could stymie the ability of some plaintiffs to seek relief in the wake of
23
employer retaliation, these courts felt constrained by what they saw as
24
Congress’s stated intent with respect to the scope of this provision.
Another court observed, “[The court] must look to what Congress
actually enacted, not what [it] believe[s] Congress might have passed
25
were it confronted with the facts at bar.”
In addition to focusing on the text of Title VII, courts that rejected
third-party retaliation claims also expressed concern about opening the
floodgates to frivolous litigation, whereby “anyone who suffered an
adverse action close in time after any other employee engaged in a
26
protected activity would have a cause of action [under Title VII].”

21. See Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1998) (“We believe that the rule
advocated by Thomas—that a plaintiff bringing a retaliation claim need not have personally engaged
in statutorily protected activity if his or her spouse or significant other, who works for the same
employer, has done so—is neither supported by the plain language of Title VII nor necessary to
protect third parties, such as spouses or significant others, from retaliation.”); see also Long, supra
note 10, at 950 (“The statute’s use of the word ‘he’ clearly seems to indicate that the person
complaining of unlawful retaliation also must have been the person participating in the protected
activity.” (footnote omitted)).
22. Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., 283 F.3d 561, 568 (3d Cir. 2002) (refusing to allow a third-party
retaliation claim under comparable retaliation provisions within the ADEA, the ADA, and state
antidiscrimination law). But see EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1210–11 (E.D. Cal.
1998) (characterizing the Title VII retaliation provision as “ambiguous” with respect to whether it
covers third-party retaliation).
23. See, e.g., Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 568–69; EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, 576 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1246
(D.N.M. 2008).
24. See Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 569; Wal-Mart Stores, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1246–47.
25. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 816 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Fogleman, 283
F.3d at 564 (“Although we recognize that allowing an employer to retaliate against a third party with
impunity can interfere with the overall purpose of the anti-discrimination laws, we believe that by
referencing to ‘such individual,’ the plain text of these statutes clearly prohibits only retaliation against
the actual person who engaged in protected activity.”); EEOC v. Bojangles Rest., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 2d
320, 327 (M.D.N.C. 2003) (“It is entirely possible that Congress could have written the statute as it did
to eliminate frivolous suits by friends, relatives, or acquaintances of persons who do fall within the
language of the statute.”); Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 25, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP,
131 S. Ct. 863 (2011) (No. 09-291) (“If Congress had intended to allow third-party retaliation claims
under Title VII, it certainly knew how to do so.”).
26. Temm, supra note 11, at 878; see Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644, 649 (6th
Cir. 2008), vacated, 567 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting that courts faced with third-party retaliation
claims “have expressed concerns as to whether this decision will result in a flood of suits from relatives
and associates of those who file EEOC charges”); see also Thompson, 567 F.3d at 813 (citing concerns
expressed in a concurring opinion in Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty.,
129 S. Ct. 846, 854 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring), about “open[ing] the door to retaliation claims by
employees who never expressed a word of opposition to their employers” and opining that this is
“exactly the conundrum presented in the instant case”).
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Every time an employee engaged in protected activity, her employer
might face a retaliation claim for taking adverse action against any of
that employee’s relatives, friends, or even mere acquaintances in the
27
workplace. From this perspective, for every Actor in the workplace that
engaged in protected activity, there could be an endless number of
Targets: an endless number of employees associated in some way with
the Actor who might claim third-party retaliation upon receiving any
future adverse treatment at work. Courts feared that, without any clear
limits on this doctrine, employers likely would be hesitant to take any
adverse action in the workplace, thus stymieing employer operations in a
28
significant way.
Finally, courts that refused to recognize third-party retaliation
claims frequently argued that allowing such claims is not necessary to
protect employees from workplace retaliation. According to these courts,
this is because parties alleging third-party retaliation typically will have
29
experienced some direct retaliation. In other words, the employee likely
will have played some “active” role in her coworker’s discrimination
claim—whether in the filing of the claim itself or in the subsequent
investigation of the claim. Wendy Wife likely helped Harry Husband file
his discrimination charge against their shared employer; Joe Senior
probably assisted the EEOC in its investigation of Joe Junior’s
discrimination charge or assisted the employer in its gathering of
evidence with respect to this charge. These employees not only may have
experienced adverse treatment at work because of their coworker’s
protected activity, but also because of their own protected activity.
Accordingly, it may not be necessary to stretch section 704(a) to
accommodate this scenario of third-party retaliation because the Target
may have a straightforward, traditional retaliation claim.

27. See, e.g., Wychock v. Coordinated Health Sys., No. CIV.A. 01-3873, 2003 WL 927704, at *7
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2003) (rejecting a third-party retaliation claim where the plaintiff was not even
distantly related to the individual who had filed the discrimination complaints and where she “d[id]
not even appear to be close friends with the claimants”); O’Connell v. Isocor Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d
649, 654 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“[T]he third-party retaliation doctrine does not cover two people whose only
connection is that they happened to work for the same company. If the doctrine stretched that far, any
employee who is terminated around the time that another employee files a discrimination suit would
have standing to sue the employer.”).
28. For a more detailed discussion of this argument, see infra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
29. See Thompson, 567 F.3d at 810 (citing a previous Fifth Circuit decision for the idea that “[i]n
most cases, the relatives and friends who are at risk for retaliation will have participated in some
manner in a co-worker’s charge of discrimination” (citation omitted)); see also Bojangles Rest., 284 F.
Supp. 2d at 327–29 (declining to recognize the third-party retaliation claim of a plaintiff fired after her
fiancé engaged in protected activity, but finding that the plaintiff might have a retaliation claim based
on her own protected activity via “participation” in her fiancé’s protected activity).
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2. Courts That Have Permitted Third-Party Retaliation Claims
In contrast to those courts that have refused to recognize third-party
retaliation claims, various lower courts (as well as the EEOC) have long
30
permitted these claims to proceed. To a large extent, courts that have
allowed third-party retaliation claims have relied primarily on the
broader purpose of Title VII’s retaliation provision. As noted above, the
purpose of antiretaliation provisions like that found in section 704(a) is
31
to “maintain[] unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” In
other words, in creating section 704(a), Congress apparently was
concerned that employees would forego availing themselves of statutory
remedial mechanisms if they feared that doing so would lead to reprisals
by their employers.
With this statutory purpose in mind, courts that have recognized
third-party retaliation claims “have done so largely on the premise that
not permitting such claims would, in effect, make a mockery of the goals
32
of anti-discrimination law.” If employers had free reign to retaliate
against employees who reported alleged workplace discrimination, then
33
fewer individuals would be likely to bring this type of behavior to light.
While this recognition of third-party retaliation claims might create
tension with the literal terms of section 704(a), “courts have routinely
adopted interpretations of retaliation provisions in employment statutes
that might be viewed as outside the literal terms of the statute in order to
34
effectuate Congress’s clear purpose in proscribing retaliatory activity.”

30. See Temm, supra note 11, at 870–71; see also Singh v. Green Thumb Landscaping, 390 F.
Supp. 2d 1129, 1135–37 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (collecting cases). The EEOC’s Compliance Manual states
that the retaliation provisions within various federal antidiscrimination statutes, including Title VII,
“prohibit retaliation against someone so closely related to or associated with the person exercising his
or her statutory rights that it would discourage or prevent the person from pursuing those rights.”
EEOC, Directives Transmittal No. 915.003, Compliance Manual § 8-II(C)(3) (1998) [hereinafter
EEOC, Compliance Manual] (footnote omitted).
31. Long, supra note 10, at 950 (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Robinson v. Shell Oil, 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)).
32. Long, supra note 10, at 950; see Temm, supra note 11, at 885–86 (asserting that interpreting
Title VII to allow third-party retaliation claims would be consistent with the overall purpose of Title
VII because “if the claims were not allowed, employees who did not engage in a protected activity but
who were retaliated against would be left without a remedy. This would produce an absurd result of
allowing employers to do indirectly what they cannot do directly” (footnotes omitted)); see also EEOC
v. Nalbandian Sales, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1212 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (“To hold otherwise, would thwart
congressional intent and produce an absurd result.”).
33. See Morgan v. Napolitano, No. CIV S-09-2649, 2010 WL 3749260, at *1, *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept.
23, 2010) (asserting that, in enacting Title VII, Congress contemplated that individuals would act as
“private attorneys general” by bringing to light discriminatory conduct in the workplace).
34. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2008), vacated, 567 F.3d 804
(6th Cir. 2009) (quoting EEOC v. Ohio Edison, 7 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 1993)).
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B. The Supreme Court’s Decision in THOMPSON
Faced with these competing arguments for and against the thirdparty retaliation doctrine, and with a split of authority in the lower
courts, the Supreme Court finally weighed in on this debate. On January
24, 2011, the Court issued an opinion in Thompson v. North American
35
Stainless, LP, a case that placed the viability and scope of the third36
party retaliation doctrine squarely at issue. In a unanimous 8–0 decision,
the Court held that (1) Title VII would bar an employer from retaliating
against an employee’s protected activity by taking adverse action against
a third party in the workplace, and (2) that this third party (the “Target”
of the employer’s adverse action) could assert a retaliation claim in these
37
circumstances.
Thompson involved a claim brought by Eric Thompson, who, along
with his then-fiancée, Miriam Regalado, worked for the defendant,
38
North American Stainless, LP. Thompson claimed that shortly after
Regalado filed a discrimination charge against North American, North
39
According to
American terminated Thompson’s employment.
Thompson, North American terminated him solely in retaliation for
40
Regalado’s protected activity.
Notably, Thompson cast his case as a fairly straightforward thirdparty retaliation claim: Thompson did not claim that he himself engaged
in any protected activity, such as by assisting Regalado in filing her
discrimination charge or otherwise opposing North American’s alleged
41
treatment of Regalado. Rather, Thompson explicitly alleged in his
complaint that his “relationship to Miriam Thompson [neé Regalado]
42
was the sole motivating factor in his termination.”
Based upon these allegations, the district court granted summary
judgment to North American, finding that Title VII “does not permit a
retaliation claim by a plaintiff who did not himself engage in protected
43
activity.” While a three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit initially
reversed the district court, holding that Thompson could pursue his claim
44
against North American, the full Sixth Circuit ultimately reached the

35. 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011).
36. Justice Kagan took no part in the consideration of this case, having recused herself. Id. at 866.
37. Id. at 868, 870.
38. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, 567 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 2009).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 807.
42. Id. at 808 (emphasis removed); see also id. (observing that Thompson’s “Statement of the
Issue” on appeal and “Statement of Facts” also made clear that Thompson’s retaliation claim was
based upon the protected activity of his fiancée, as opposed to any activity that he engaged in himself).
43. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 435 F. Supp. 2d 633, 638 (E.D. Ky. 2006).
44. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644, 645 (6th Cir. 2008), vacated, 567 F.3d 804
(6th Cir. 2009).
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opposite conclusion, holding that Thompson could not proceed with his
45
retaliation claim. According to the en banc court, “the authorized class
of claimants [under section 704(a)] is limited to persons who have
46
personally engaged in protected activity.” Because Thompson did not
claim to have engaged personally in any protected activity, but rather
merely claimed to have been retaliated against as a result of Regalado’s
protected activity, the Sixth Circuit held that his retaliation claim could
47
not proceed.
In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit, like other courts that
have rejected third-party retaliation claims, relied in large part on what it
deemed to be the plain meaning of the statute, noting that “[c]ertainly it
was Congress’s prerogative to create—or refrain from creating—a
federal cause of action for civil rights retaliation and to mold the scope of
48
such legislation.” The court concluded that it “must look to what
Congress actually enacted, not what we believe Congress might have
49
passed were it confronted with the facts at bar.” In addition, the court
seemed troubled by the potential “slippery slope” that could arise if it
allowed a claim like Thompson’s to proceed, whereby the court would
“open the door to retaliation claims by employees who never expressed a
50
word of opposition to their employers.”
The Supreme Court, however, took a different approach than that
adopted by the en banc Sixth Circuit, finding that Thompson could allege
a third-party retaliation claim based upon Regalado’s protected activity.
First, relying in large part on its previous decision in Burlington Northern
& Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, in which it had expanded its view of
what would constitute an “adverse action” for purposes of section
51
704(a), the Court emphasized that the retaliation provision of Title VII
(unlike the statute’s substantive provision) “is not limited to
discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of
52
employment,” but rather “prohibits any employer action that well might
have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
53
of discrimination.” In other words, courts should ask whether the
employer conduct in question—whether directed at the Actor who
engaged in protected activity or at a coworker of that Actor—might

45. Thompson, 567 F.3d at 804.
46. Id. at 805.
47. Id. at 805–06.
48. Id. at 807.
49. Id. at 816.
50. Id. at 813 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville
& Davidson Cnty., 129 S. Ct. 846, 854 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring)).
51. 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006); see also infra notes 145–46, 150–56 and accompanying text.
52. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
53. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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reasonably have changed the Actor’s mind about engaging in protected
activity in the first place.
The Court also responded to concerns regarding the “difficult linedrawing problems” that might emerge from allowing third-party
54
retaliation claims. While the Court acknowledged the existence of these
concerns, it declined to let such worries preclude the viability of third55
party retaliation claims generally. Moreover, the Court declined to
provide any specific guidance regarding the types of relationships that
56
could support a third-party retaliation claim. Instead, the Court
indicated that courts should examine the “particular circumstances” in
any given case to determine whether to recognize a claim of third-party
57
retaliation, emphasizing only that “the provision’s standard for judging
harm must be objective,” as opposed to relying upon a plaintiff’s
58
subjective feelings. In other words, the Court merely indicated that
third-party retaliation claims could (sometimes) be brought, without
outlining any guidelines for defining the scope such claims.
In addition to deeming third-party retaliation claims generally
cognizable under Title VII, the Thompson Court also addressed who
should be permitted to bring these types of claims. Title VII permits a
59
person “claiming to be aggrieved” to bring a civil action, which North
American had argued should be interpreted to allow only the employee
60
who engaged in protected activity to sue. The Court, however, rejected
this view, drawing upon a body of administrative law to conclude that a
“person aggrieved” for purposes of Title VII would be anyone within the
61
“zone of interests” of the statute. Applying this “zone of interests” test,
the Court held that so long as the interests that a plaintiff sought to
protect were sufficiently related to the purposes of Title VII, that
individual would be permitted to bring a third-party retaliation claim,
regardless of whether the employee personally had engaged in protected
62
activity.

54. Id.
55. See id.
56. Id. (“We must also decline to identify a fixed class of relationships for which third-party
reprisals are unlawful.”).
57. Id.
58. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2010).
60. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 870.
61. Id.
62. See id. (“We have described the ‘zone of interests’ test as denying a right of review if the
plaintiff’s interests are so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute
that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted)).
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II. Where the Supreme Court Falls Short:
The Need to Further Define WHEN a Third-Party Retaliation
Claim Exists and WHO Has the Power to Litigate This Claim
Those courts that have recognized third-party retaliation claims—
including, most recently, the Supreme Court—have articulated
compelling reasons for permitting these types of claims to proceed. One
such reason is the tremendous loophole that would arise if employers,
barred from retaliating directly against employees who engage in some
protected activity, simply could take out their ire on those “associated”
with such employees. However, no court (not even the Supreme Court)
has adequately addressed the concerns raised by opponents to thirdparty retaliation claims, including the need to articulate some limit on
these types of claims. Absent any such limits, many fear that courts will
be inundated with frivolous suits brought by any employee who receives
adverse action after one of her coworkers has engaged in some protected
activity. Yet when it came to confronting these concerns in its most
recent decision, the Supreme Court essentially punted, expressly
declining to provide lower courts with significant guidance regarding
what logical limits might be placed on third-party retaliation claims.
This Part addresses this void in the Supreme Court’s opinion by
articulating two sets of limits that should apply to third-party retaliation
claims. While this Article agrees with the Court that courts should not
close the door entirely to claims of third-party retaliation, it asserts that
courts should define the scope of the third-party retaliation doctrine in
two ways: (1) by applying a framework used in negligent infliction of
emotional distress claims to identify viable third-party retaliation claims,
and (2) by requiring that only a party who engaged in protected activity
(the Actor) be permitted to bring a third-party retaliation claim.
A. How a Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Analysis Can
Inform Courts Considering Third-Party Retaliation Claims
As noted above, a primary concern raised by courts that oppose
recognition of third-party retaliation claims is the fear of boundless
liability for employers, if claims can be made by anyone in the workplace
who is associated with an employee engaging in protected activity, no
matter the length of time that has passed since that activity and no matter
the relationship between the two employees. In this vein, even some
proponents of the third-party retaliation doctrine have recognized the
63
need to place some limits on this doctrine. Yet the scholarship in this

63. See, e.g., Temm, supra note 11, at 865 (advocating that “third-party retaliation claims should
be allowed but . . . a line must be drawn to limit these claims,” and focusing on the relationship
between the plaintiff and third-party to limit the scope of this doctrine); see also Thomas v. Am. Horse
Shows Assoc., No. 97-CV-3513 JG, 1999 WL 287721 at *1, *12 (E.D.N.Y Apr. 23, 1999) (recognizing
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area thus far has failed to articulate a framework that properly balances
the need to punish and deter third-party retaliation while still imposing
appropriate boundaries on this doctrine.
This Article attempts to establish such boundaries by drawing upon
a seemingly unrelated area of the law: cases alleging negligent infliction
of emotional distress (“NIED”). This Article asserts that the factors
applied by many courts in analyzing NIED claims also can define the
scope of the third-party retaliation doctrine. Specifically, just as courts in
a NIED context often apply a multifactor “bystander analysis” to ensure
a sufficient link between the plaintiff’s mental injury and the defendant’s
64
alleged wrongful conduct, courts could apply these same factors to a
plaintiff’s third-party retaliation claim to define the contours of section
704(a).
Negligent infliction of emotional distress claims arise when an
actor’s unintentional, negligent conduct inflicts emotional harm on
65
another individual. One common scenario in which this claim will occur
involves a plaintiff who was not the target of negligence by the
defendant, but who suffers emotional distress upon observing or otherwise
66
perceiving harm to a third party. Notably, courts reviewing NIED
claims frequently have expressed the same types of concerns as have
courts analyzing third-party retaliation claims. Courts in NIED cases
express wariness of the potential for unwarranted, excessive exposure for
67
68
defendants and the potential for fraudulent or frivolous claims.
Thus, just as in the context of third-party retaliation claims, a
looming question for courts in the NIED context involves how to limit
the scope of the NIED doctrine—how to decide which plaintiffs properly
can seek judicial relief versus which plaintiffs’ harm should be deemed
69
too remote. In response to this question, courts have adopted a variety
the potential for plaintiffs to assert third-party retaliation claims but rejecting the plaintiff’s claim due
to the lack of a causal nexus between her sister’s protected activity and adverse action toward the
plaintiff); O’Connell v. Isocor Corp., 56 F. Supp. 2d 649, 654 (E.D. Va. 1999) (recognizing the viability
of third-party retaliation doctrine but declining to extend this doctrine to cover unrelated coworkers).
64. See infra notes 74–80 and accompanying text.
65. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1135 (9th ed. 2009).
66. The tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts proposes three specific scenarios in
which a NIED claim could arise: First, an actor’s negligent conduct might have created the potential
for bodily harm to the emotionally harmed plaintiff, but ultimately only caused emotional harm;
second, the negligent conduct might involve activity that does not create any risk of bodily harm, but
nevertheless poses a risk of serious emotional harm; or third, an actor’s negligence might cause
emotional harm to a bystander through the mechanism of bodily harm to another person. See
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical & Emotional Harm §§ 46, 47 (Tentative Draft
No. 5, 2007). This Article focuses on the third type of NIED, in which emotional distress is the indirect
result of bodily harm to another individual.
67. See Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
Claims, 36 Ariz. St. L.J. 805, 831–34 (2004).
68. See id.
69. See Meredith E. Green, Note, Who Knows Where the Love Grows?: Unmarried Cohabitants
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of approaches for addressing these types of NIED claims and have
70
exhibited varying degrees of acceptance for these claims. Some courts
previously imposed a “physical impact” requirement as a prerequisite to
bringing a NIED claim, insisting that a mental injury must result from
71
some contemporaneous physical impact, or must manifest into actual
72
physical symptoms in order for the NIED claim to proceed. Later
decisions have adhered to a “zone of danger” test, allowing a plaintiff to
recover for mental injuries that result from witnessing harm to another
individual, or from the fear of harm to herself, so long as the plaintiff was
73
in sufficient physical proximity to this potential harm.
Other jurisdictions have adopted a “bystander theory” for NIED
74
claims. First recognized by the California Supreme Court in the seminal
75
case of Dillon v. Legg, and now widely accepted (including within the
76
tentative draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts), the bystander
theory for NIED recovery focuses on three elements to determine
whether to allow compensation to an emotionally injured plaintiff under
a NIED theory. First, the court will examine the plaintiff’s physical
proximity to the event giving rise to the emotional distress (“spatial
77
proximity”). Was the emotionally distressed plaintiff “located near the
scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away
78
from it”? Second, the court will examine whether the plaintiff’s
and Bystander Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1093,
1094 (2009) (noting that courts limit the scope of NIED claims due, among other things, to “concern
about the potential flood of litigation resulting from recognition of stand-alone emotional harm as a
cognizable injury” and to “concern over the lack of objective verification of emotional distress and the
resulting potential for fraudulent claims” (footnotes omitted)).
70. See id. at 1094–97; Rhee, supra note 67, at 813–18; see also Dan B. Dobbs, Undertakings and
Special Relationships in Claims for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, 50 Ariz. L. Rev. 49, 51–
53 (2008).
71. See Rhee, supra note 67, at 815–16.
72. See Dobbs, supra note 70, at 52 (“[Courts adhering to the physical impact test] insist[] that the
plaintiff must prove the reality of emotional distress by showing that it resulted in physical harm or
physical symptoms.” (footnote omitted)).
73. Rhee, supra note 67, at 817. While courts applying this “zone of danger” test have required
that the plaintiff actually fall within the “zone of danger” in order to proceed with an NIED claim,
other courts have deemed it sufficient for a plaintiff merely to have been present to perceive an injury
to her child or family member. See Dobbs, supra note 70, at 52–53.
74. See Dobbs supra note 70, at 52–53; Rhee, supra note 67, at 819–23.
75. 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968).
76. Green, supra note 69, at 1096; see also id. at 1097 n.27 (noting that twenty-nine jurisdictions
currently follow the Dillon “bystander theory” or some version thereof when analyzing NIED claims).
Section 47 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts describes this test in a somewhat different manner and
condenses its analysis into two (as opposed to three) inquiries: “An actor who negligently causes
serious bodily injury to a third person is subject to liability for serious emotional disturbance thereby
caused to a person who: (a) perceives the event contemporaneously, and (b) is a close family member
of the person suffering the bodily injury.” Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical &
Emotional Harm § 47 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007).
77. See Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920; see also Green, supra note 69, at 1096.
78. Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920.
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emotional distress resulted from a sensory and contemporaneous
79
observation of the accident or injury (“temporal proximity”). Was the
emotionally distressed plaintiff present at the time that the defendant’s
negligent act took place, or did the plaintiff arrive on the scene long after
the fact? Finally, the court will examine the relationship between the
emotionally distressed plaintiff and the individual who suffered physical
80
harm (“relational proximity”). Were these parties spouses? Blood
relatives? Mere friends or acquaintances?
1. Applying a Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Framework
to Third-Party Retaliation Claims
This three-factor bystander framework for analyzing NIED claims
provides a viable framework for courts seeking to define the scope of the
third-party retaliation doctrine. Each of the three factors used by courts
to decide whether a NIED claim can proceed could be applied to thirdparty retaliation claims to determine which potential plaintiffs should be
permitted to sue based upon an employer’s alleged third-party retaliation.
At first blush, it may seem unusual to apply a common law doctrine
to a federal statutory claim. Yet the Supreme Court has done this in the
past, including in the context of Title VII itself. In describing the
framework for sexual harassment liability under Title VII, the Court
relied in large part on common law agency principles, looking to the
agency relationship between the particular employee accused of
81
harassing behavior and her employer. Applying these agency principles,
the Court held that, in some circumstances, an employer may be
82
vicariously liable for the unlawful harassing conduct of its employees.
Common law notions of agency expanded the scope of employer liability
for the unlawful behavior of the employer’s employees.
An additional challenge in applying these NIED factors to a thirdparty retaliation claim involves whether it is proper to apply a negligence
framework to what consistently is seen as an intentional wrong by
employers. Unlike a negligence claim, an allegation of retaliation under
Title VII focuses in large part on an employer’s intent: retaliation is seen
83
as an intentional harm. Negligence, of course, presumes a lack of any

79. See id.; see also Green, supra note 69, at 1096.
80. See Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920; see also Green, supra note 69, at 1096.
81. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754, 764–65 (1998); see also Faragher v.
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802–03 (1998).
82. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754, 756, 765.
83. See, e.g., Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 480–81 (2008) (citing with approval language
from Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167, 173–74, which analyzed Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 and held that “[r]etaliation against a person because that person has
complained of sex discrimination is another form of intentional sex discrimination . . . . Retaliation is,
by definition, an intentional act” (ellipses in original)).
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84

intent to cause harm.
Yet despite this difference in the mental states of the wrongdoers in
each of these claims, the NIED factors provide a useful framework for
defining the scope of the third-party retaliation doctrine. Both NIED
claims and third-party retaliation claims raise complicated questions of
causation for a court to resolve. In the NIED context, the court must sort
out whether a sufficient connection exists between a plaintiff’s mental
injury and some physical harm or act that did not directly impact the
85
plaintiff. In other words, the court must determine whether this physical
act was the cause of the plaintiff’s mental injury. In a way, the three
factors cited above—spatial proximity, temporal proximity, and
relational proximity—serve as a proxy for testing causation, by
determining whether a close enough relationship exists between the
external physical harm and the plaintiff’s mental injury.
Third-party retaliation claims raise similar concerns about
attenuated causation, and these three factors therefore may serve a
similar function in this context. Even in a straightforward, traditional
retaliation claim, causation often presents complicated questions for the
court due to conflicting arguments by the plaintiff and defendant
regarding the real reason for the adverse action toward the plaintiff.
However, causation is even more complex in a third-party retaliation
case, where an even greater distance inherently exists between the
protected activity engaged in by one party and the adverse action
experienced by another. The link between the protected activity and the
adverse action is even harder to sort out. The NIED factors can help in
this respect. Just as these factors help courts analyze causation in a NIED
context, so too can they help courts to structure the causation inquiry in a
third-party retaliation context, by providing courts with some structure
for conducting this causation analysis. The fact that NIED claims require
mere negligence while retaliation claims require intent becomes largely
irrelevant when one focuses on the basic idea that in both contexts, the
plaintiff must prove causation.
In the context of a NIED claim, courts that adhere to the
“bystander” theory will focus upon how physically close the mentally
injured plaintiff was to the accident or event that caused harm to

84. See Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 65, (defining “negligence,” as, inter alia, “any
conduct that falls below the legal standard established to protect others against unreasonable risk of
harm, except for conduct that is intentionally, wantonly, or willfully disregardful of others’ rights”).
85. See Cohen v. Nuvasive, Inc., Nos. B194078, B196905, 2010 WL 1380447, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App.
Apr. 7, 2010) (“A plaintiff seeking to recover damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress
must establish a direct causal connection between the defendant’s misconduct and the plaintiff’s
emotional distress.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Rhee, supra note 67, at
808–09 (discussing the difficulty in verifying mental injuries and in gauging individual emotional
responses to horrendous circumstances).
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86

someone else. For example, one court permitted a plaintiff to proceed
with her NIED claim when she claimed to have been in a room
adjoining—and thus, presumably, mere feet away from—the one in
which a propane explosion killed one of her daughters and severely
87
injured another. In contrast, another court refused to permit a NIED
claim by a father who was at least a half-mile away when his son was shot
88
accidentally. According to the court, this physical distance between the
plaintiff and the accident causing harm to his son meant that the plaintiff
89
could not be deemed a “bystander” for purposes of his NIED claim.
In this way, courts faced with NIED claims apply this notion of
spatial proximity to ensure that a mentally injured plaintiff was “close
enough” to the physical harm so as to find a connection between these
two injuries. Courts analyzing third-party retaliation claims could apply
this same spatial proximity analysis to determine causation with respect
to a retaliation claim. Spatial proximity would be one part of the courts’
inquiry in determining whether an Actor’s protected activity caused the
adverse action toward the Target. The closer the spatial proximity
between the Actor and the Target, the more inclined the court should be
to find this connection. In conducting this analysis, courts would examine
the “spatial distance” between the Actor and the Target on various
levels, both concrete and physical as well as metaphorical. Did these two
individuals simply work for the same employer, or were they located in
the same building? Did these two employees work within the same
department or division? Were they working on projects together? Did
they share the same supervisor? All of these questions might be very
relevant to deciding whether an Actor should be able to sue for thirdparty retaliation based upon adverse action to a Target.
In other words, courts examining spatial proximity would focus not
only on the physical distance between the Actor and Target but also on
other types of separation in the workplace between the Actor and the
Target, such as their respective locations within the company hierarchy
and supervisory structures. A Target within the same chain of command
as an Actor would be better positioned to bring a third-party retaliation
claim, because the same decisionmaker who received notice of the
Actor’s protected activity likely would be involved in taking adverse
action against the Target. For example, if Joe Senior and Joe Junior
worked in the same department and reported to the same supervisor, a
court understandably might be somewhat suspicious if Joe Junior was

86. See supra text accompanying notes 77–78.
87. See Wilks v. Hom, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 803, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).
88. Lehmann v. Wieghat, 917 S.W.2d 379, 384 (Tex. App. 1996); see also Thing v. La Chusa, 771
P.2d 814, 814 (Cal. 1989) (refusing to permit a NIED claim by a mother who was not at the scene when
the defendant’s car hit her child, but rather who arrived at the scene several moments later).
89. Lehmann, 917 S.W.2d at 384.
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fired a short time after Joe Senior filed a discrimination complaint.
However, where businesses may have thousands of employees and
operations all over the world, greater “distance” between an Actor and
Target might cast doubt on a plaintiff’s third-party retaliation claim. If
Joe Junior worked across the country from his father, in a different
department reporting to different superiors, a court looking only at the
spatial proximity between these two individuals might question whether
some protected activity by Joe Senior would have any bearing on Joe
Junior’s treatment at work.
Thus, courts could use the distance in the workplace (both physical
and otherwise) between the Actor and Target as one means of limiting
the scope of the third-party retaliation doctrine. The closer the distance
between these two individuals, the more plausible it should seem to find
a connection between the Actor’s protected activity and subsequent
adverse action experienced by the Target.
A second factor that courts should apply in adopting the NIED
“bystander” theory to third-party retaliation claims is the abovedescribed notion of temporal proximity. As previously discussed, courts
that apply the bystander theory to NIED claims will examine whether
the plaintiff’s alleged emotional distress resulted from a “sensory and
contemporaneous observance of the accident,” as opposed to situations
where a plaintiff merely learned about the accident from others after the
90
fact. Courts will be less likely to entertain NIED claims made by
plaintiffs who did not observe the accident in question personally, as it
91
occurred.
In the context of a third-party retaliation claim, a court would want
to evaluate the amount of time between the Actor engaging in protected
activity and the Target receiving adverse action from her employer. Was
the Target fired within hours or days of the employer learning that a
coworker—the employee’s spouse or sibling or friend—engaged in some
92
protected activity? Or did months, or even years, pass between the
Actor’s protected activity and the Target suffering any adverse
93
workplace action? The more time that has passed between the Actor

90. See supra note 79 and accompanying text; see also Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968).
91. See, e.g., Lehmann, 917 S.W.2d at 384 (noting that the plaintiff did not learn of her son’s
accident until five or ten minutes after it occurred).
92. Cf. Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 519, 523 (6th Cir. 2008) (reversing
summary judgment for the defendant in a direct (as opposed to third-party) retaliation case where the
employer terminated the employee on the same day that it learned of the employee’s EEOC charge).
93. See, e.g., Thomas v. Am. Horse Shows Assoc., No. 97-CV-3513 JG, 1999 WL 287721 at *13–14
(E.D.N.Y Apr. 23, 1999) (granting summary judgment for the defendant on a third-party retaliation
claim where eighteen months passed between the plaintiff’s sister engaging in protected activity and
the alleged adverse action toward the plaintiff); see also Zuk v. Onondaga Cnty., No. 5:07-CV-732
(GTS/GJD), 2010 WL 3909524, at *1, *18 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (rejecting the plaintiff’s thirdparty retaliation claim because, inter alia, the plaintiff experienced adverse action approximately eight
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engaging in a protected activity and the Target receiving some adverse
action, the less likely it is that the Actor’s conduct caused the Target’s
adverse action.
Finally, courts could apply the relational proximity factor from the
NIED bystander framework to define the scope of permissible thirdparty retaliation claims. As noted above, in the NIED context, courts
examine the relationship between the individual who suffered from some
physical injury and the plaintiff who suffered mental harm from exposure
94
to this other person’s physical injury. Notably, courts analyzing this
factor for purposes of NIED claims have adopted differing views
regarding precisely how close these two parties must be before the court
95
will allow the NIED claim to proceed. Most jurisdictions require fairly
close ties between the mentally injured plaintiff and the individual who
96
suffered physical harm—generally something akin to immediate family.
Just as with the other two criteria from the NIED bystander
framework, this relational proximity component also could help courts
determine the viability of a plaintiff’s third-party retaliation claim. A
court would look at the nature of the relationship between the Actor
who engaged in the protected activity and the Target who later received
adverse action. Were these two parties immediate family: spouses,
97
siblings, or parent and child? Or were they mere casual workplace
98
acquaintances? The closer the relationship between the plaintiff-Actor
and the third-party-Target, the more likely a court would be to allow the
plaintiff’s third-party retaliation claim to proceed.
years after his future fiancée engaged in protected activity).
94. See Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920 (“[C]ourts will take into account . . . [w]hether plaintiff was located
near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it.”); see also
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical & Emotional Harm § 47 (Tentative Draft No.
5, 2007) (finding liability for negligent infliction of emotional disturbance only where the person
suffering emotional distress “is a close family member of the person suffering the bodily injury”).
95. See Green, supra note 69, at 1097–98 (discussing the debate among courts regarding the
required “closeness of the relationship” between the plaintiff and the injured third-party victim for
purposes of an NIED claim).
96. See id. (noting that many American jurisdictions adhere to a rule that limits recovery to
relatives residing in the same household or to other immediate family members, such as parents,
siblings, children, or grandparents of the injured third-party). But see Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Liability for Physical & Emotional Harm § 47 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2007) (“When defining
what constitutes a close family relationship, courts should take into account changing practices and
social norms and employ a functional approach to determine what constitutes a family.”).
97. See, e.g., Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., 283 F.3d 561, 564 (3d Cir. 2002) (refusing to allow a thirdparty retaliation claim where a son claimed to have been terminated due to the protected activities of
his father); EEOC v. Nalbandian Sales, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1210–13 (E.D. Cal. 1998) (permitting a
third-party retaliation claim where an employee claimed not to have been rehired in retaliation for
protected activity of his sister); Murphy v. Cadillac Rubber & Plastics, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1108, 1118
(W.D.N.Y. 1996) (permitting a third-party retaliation claim where a husband claimed to have been
retaliated against for protected activity of his wife).
98. See, e.g., Freeman v. Barnhart, No. C 06-04900 JSW, 2008 WL 744827, at *5, *7, *11 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 18, 2008).
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In trying to pin down this criterion in particular, scholars and courts
have fretted about the particular types of relationships that should be
able to support a third-party retaliation claim. If the third-party
retaliation doctrine were truly unlimited by the relationship between the
two parties, it would mean that every time an employee engaged in
protected activity for purposes of Title VII, her employer would have
exposure to a retaliation claim under Title VII for taking adverse action
99
against any relative, friend, or acquaintance of this original employee.
In this respect, some courts have been wary of applying the third-party
retaliation doctrine in cases involving relatively attenuated relationships
between the Actor and Target. In O’Connell v. Isocor Corp., for
example, the plaintiff claimed third-party retaliation based upon the
protected activity of a mere coworker—someone with whom the plaintiff
shared little more than the fact that they both worked for the same
100
company. Rejecting the plaintiff’s third-party retaliation claim, the
court observed that “[i]f the doctrine stretched that far, any employee
who is terminated around the time that another employee files a
101
discrimination suit would have standing to sue the employer.” In
Morgan v. Napolitano, the plaintiff stretched this argument in a different
direction, claiming retaliation based upon the protected activity of his
wife, who was not even employed by the same employer as the
102
plaintiff.
During the oral argument before the Supreme Court in Thompson,
Justice Alito focused upon these types of concerns regarding the scope of
the relationships covered by the third-party retaliation doctrine,
inquiring of Thompson’s counsel, “Suppose Thompson were not
Regalado’s fiancé at the time. Suppose they were . . . just good
friends . . . . The way the company wanted to get at her was by firing her
103
friend. Would that be enough?” Advocating for what he called a “clear
line” in this area, Justice Alito observed, “I can imagine a whole
spectrum of cases in which there is a lesser relationship between those
two persons, and . . . unless there’s a clear line there someplace, this
99. See Temm, supra note 11, at 878; see also Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644, 654
(6th Cir. 2008), vacated, 567 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2009) (Griffin, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority as
creating a situation where “[a]ll persons, no matter how loosely related or ‘associated’ to the person
who engaged in protected activity, may sue for retaliation if they can show that adverse action taken
against them would ‘discourage’ the employee who actually engaged in the protected activity from
exercising his rights”).
100. 56 F. Supp. 2d 649, 653–54 (E.D. Va. 1999).
101. Id. at 654; see also Freeman, 2008 WL 744827, at *7 (rejecting a third-party retaliation claim
where the plaintiff “[wa]s not related, even distantly, to the employees who filed complaints,” and
“[did] not even appear to be close friends with the claimants”).
102. No. CIV S-09-2649, 2010 WL 3749260, at *1, *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2010) (finding that a
plaintiff may state a claim for third-party retaliation based upon the conduct of his nonemployee
lawyer-wife, who represented the plaintiff’s coworkers in discrimination suits).
103. Thompson Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 14, at 11.
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104

theory is rather troubling.” Chief Justice Roberts similarly expressed
trepidation, inquiring of the Deputy Solicitor General (who was arguing
in favor of the Petitioner, Thompson), “How are we supposed to tell, or
how is an employer supposed to tell, whether somebody is close enough
105
or not?”
Faced with these types of line-drawing concerns, some scholars and
courts have proposed limiting third-party retaliation claims to parties
with particular types of relationships: spouses, siblings, parents, and
106
children. However, while one can understand the desire for a hard-andfast rule regarding the types of relationships that will support third-party
retaliation claims, this Article adopts a somewhat different perspective,
declining to articulate particular relationships that should (or should not)
qualify for protection in the context of a third-party retaliation claim.
Indeed, the evolution and complexity of modern familial relationships
may stymie any attempt at drawing clear lines in this context. For
example, given that spouses likely would qualify for protection under a
third-party retaliation framework, one might wonder whether such
protection should apply equally to same-sex domestic partners,
particularly in a jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex civil unions. Given
107
the large number of couples who now live together prior to marriage,
some reasonably might question whether protection should extend to
individuals in those relationships—even if the couple has no intention of
marrying. Extended family members are living together in increasing
108
numbers; should protection extend to grandparents and children who
reside in the same household? It is unlikely that these types of questions
could be answered satisfactorily by an opinion that established bright
lines regarding the types of relationships eligible for protection under the
third-party retaliation doctrine.
104. Id. at 12.
105. Id. at 20.
106. See, e.g., Wychock v. Coordinated Health Sys., No. CIV.A. 01-3873, 2003 WL 927704, at *6
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2003) (stating that the retaliation provision in the ADA allows for third-party
retaliation claims only where the plaintiff is “[a] close relative[] of an individual who did in fact engage
in a protected activity”); see also Temm, supra note 11, at 865–66 (“Plaintiffs who have a relationship
so close with the employee who took the protected action that deterrence may be presumed, such as
spouses, siblings, and parents and children, should be allowed to have a cause of action because of the
deterrent effect retaliation would have on the person exercising her rights.”).
107. Jeremy Olson, More Couples Opting for Apartment Before Altar, Chi. Trib., Oct. 18, 2010, at
13 (noting an increase nationally to 7.5 million unmarried couples living together in 2010, up from 6.7
million couples in 2009); Janice Shaw Crouse, Cohabitation Nation: Growing Trend Results in
Declining Household Stability, Wash. Times, Nov. 22, 2010, at B1 (noting a dramatic increase of nearly
1000 percent since the 1970s in couples living together without marriage).
108. See Grandparents Raising Grandchildren: Skipping a Generation, Economist, June 16, 2007, at
84 (noting that in 2000, 2.4 million grandparents were raising their children’s children); cf. Reporter’s
Notebook, Crain’s Clev. Bus., Sept. 20, 2010, at 27 (discussing nontraditional families as the basis for
amending the Family Medical Leave Act, highlighting grandparents who have taken in grandchildren
and same-sex partners raising children together).
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In this respect, this Article approves of the Supreme Court’s
election in Thompson to “decline to identify a fixed class of relationships
109
for which third-party reprisals are unlawful.” To be sure, the Supreme
Court is correct that “the significance of any given act of retaliation will
110
often depend upon the particular circumstances.” Yet by refusing to
provide any further guidance on this issue—other than to observe that
“firing a close family member will almost always meet the . . . standard,
and inflicting a milder reprisal on a mere acquaintance will almost never
111
do so” —the Court missed an opportunity to provide direction to lower
courts that will be faced with claims falling between these two ends of the
spectrum. While it is true that these cases must be resolved on their facts,
lower courts need some roadmap for analyzing these often complex
situations.
This is where the application of the NIED bystander theory will play
an important role in providing guidance to lower courts. Courts faced
with claims of third-party retaliation should examine the relationship
between the Actor and Target in light of the other NIED criteria
mentioned above: spatial proximity and temporal proximity. For
example, assume that Tammy Target was demoted after Alice Actor—a
mere workplace friend—filed a discrimination claim against their mutual
employer. Under an all-or-nothing framework that requires close
“family-like” relationships between Actors and Targets, many courts
likely would reject a third-party retaliation claim brought under these
facts. But this perspective might change if Tammy Target and Alice
Actor not only worked for the same employer, but also worked in the
same department, for the same supervisor, and this supervisor made the
demotion decision. It also might change if Tammy’s demotion took place
within hours or days of her supervisor learning about Alice’s
discrimination claim. Suddenly, the employer’s conduct seems much
more suspicious under section 704(a), despite the otherwise “distant”
relationship between Tammy and Alice. By accounting for all of the
NIED bystander theory factors—spatial, temporal, and relational
proximity—a court could conduct a more nuanced analysis of this claim.
The close spatial and temporal proximity in this scenario could raise
sufficient suspicion by a court to allow Alice to bring a third-party

109. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011). Notably, this stance is
consistent with the EEOC’s view that Title VII should “prohibit retaliation against someone so closely
related to or associated with the person exercising his or her statutory rights that it would discourage
or prevent the person from pursuing those rights.” EEOC, Compliance Manual, supra note 30, § 8II(C)(3) (emphasis added).
110. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 868 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69
(2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id.
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retaliation claim, despite the attenuated relational proximity between her
and Tammy.
Thus, one significant benefit of applying this three-factor NIED
bystander framework to third-party retaliation claims is that it gives
courts a clear outline for analyzing these claims, while still leaving them
with sufficient flexibility to apply the facts within each part of the
framework. Rather than having to come up with bright-line rules
regarding the required distance in the workplace between the Target and
the Actor, or regarding how much time can pass between the Actor’s
protected activity and the Target’s experiencing adverse action, or
regarding the type of relationship that must exist between the Actor and
Target, courts would have leeway to examine the totality of a situation,
using these three factors as a framework. In this way, the NIED
bystander framework would allow courts to take into account all of the
circumstances surrounding an employee’s third-party retaliation claim
before deciding whether to permit that claim to proceed.
Moreover, in addition to providing more flexibility to courts
analyzing third-party retaliation claims, this framework could help to
placate the concerns expressed by employers, courts, and other
commentators about creating a slippery slope of liability for employers in
this area. This slippery slope flows from the reality that, in the modern
workplace, employers often act in prophylactic ways to avoid violating
the law—taking measures not otherwise required by law in order to
minimize their potential liability. Among other measures, employers will
adopt extra precautions before taking adverse action against employees
112
who fall within Title VII’s protections. For example, an employer might
hesitate before terminating a particular employee who happens to be
female or Hispanic. In the same respect, the employer might think twice
before demoting a particular worker who previously complained of
workplace discrimination. Even where the termination or demotion has
nothing to do with the employee’s gender or nationality or previous
discrimination complaint, savvy employers know that it might cost them
well into the six figures to defend against a Title VII discrimination or
retaliation suit—even where the suit ultimately proves to be without
113
merit. By more thoroughly articulating the factors that lower courts

112. See Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context: Title VII as a Tool for Institutional
Reform, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 659, 705 (2003) (acknowledging that Title VII enforcement litigation can
provide a foundation for increased compliance with the law, but noting that it also leads to the
“adoption of merely symbolic reform”); Audrey J. Lee, Comment, Unconscious Bias Theory in
Employment Discrimination Litigation, 40 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 481, 488 (2005) (“[E]mployers’
heightened awareness of the legal ramifications for discriminatory transgressions—learned through
litigation, among other means—suggests that employers will be increasingly savvy in not documenting,
outwardly expressing, or retaining anything that is potentially damaging.”).
113. According to one recent study, it costs, on average, over $120,000 simply to defend against a
wrongful discharge claim, not including any costs of settling the claim or any judgment that a
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should examine in evaluating a third-party retaliation claim, the Supreme
Court would allow employers to better predict their potential exposure
from taking (presumably legitimate) adverse action against an employee.
2. Application of the Bystander Framework to the Thompson Case
How would this framework affect the Thompson case? If the
Supreme Court applied these NIED bystander factors to Thompson’s
claim, would the Court still find a viable third-party retaliation claim?
First, in terms of spatial proximity, both Regalado and Thompson
114
worked as quality-control engineers for North American. While North
American was a fairly large company, with approximately 500 to 600
115
employees by 2003 (the year that Thompson was terminated), both
Regalado and Thompson worked in the technical department, which was
“a small department” according to North American’s head of human
116
resources at the time of Thompson’s suit. Moreover, both Regalado
117
and Thompson reported to the same supervisors, further strengthening
this argument of close spatial proximity.
In terms of temporal proximity, the facts also weigh in favor of
permitting Thompson to sue. According to Thompson’s complaint,
Regalado filed her gender discrimination charge with the EEOC in
September 2002, and the EEOC notified North American of this charge
118
on February 13, 2003. Slightly more than three weeks later, on March 7,
2003, North American terminated Thompson’s employment, allegedly
119
Unlike those cases where many
for performance-based reasons.
months (or even years) may have elapsed between an Actor engaging in
protected activity and a Target receiving adverse action from an
120
employer, this relatively short time span would likely raise a court’s
suspicions about a link between North American learning of Regalado’s
protected activity and then making the decision to terminate Regalado’s
fiancé.

defendant may ultimately have to pay. See Brief of Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 2, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S.
Ct. 863 (2011) (No. 09-291), 2010 WL 4339890 at *2; see also Jessica Fink, Unintended Consequences:
How Antidiscrimination Litigation Increases Group Bias in Employer-Defendants, 38 N.M. L. Rev.
333, 340 (2008) (“Some estimate that an employer may spend close to $100,000 to defend against an
individual claim of discrimination, and more than $460,000 to defend against a discrimination class
action.” (footnote omitted)).
114. Memorandum of Law Opposing Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Thompson v.
N. Am. Stainless, LP, 435 F. Supp. 2d 633 (E.D. Ky. 2006) (No. 3:05-02-JMH), 2006 WL 1493341 at *6
(hereinafter Thompson Plaintiff’s Memorandum).
115. See id. at 2, 4.
116. Id. at 7, 9.
117. Id. at 2, 8.
118. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 806 (6th Cir. 2009).
119. See id.
120. See supra note 93.
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Finally, the relational proximity between Thompson and Regalado
likely would pass muster under this NIED bystander framework. To be
sure, many third-party retaliation cases involve relationships closer than
that in this case, such as where a child is fired in retaliation for the acts of
121
a parent, or where a husband is punished in retaliation for the acts of
122
his wife. But if the purpose of a court’s inquiry under this factor is to
determine whether the relationship between the Actor and Target is such
that the Actor reasonably would be deterred from engaging in protected
activity based upon adverse effects for the Target, then the relationship
between Thompson and Regalado would likely suffice. Certainly, a court
reasonably could assume that an individual might have second thoughts
about complaining of workplace discrimination if she thought that such a
123
complaint might lead to adverse action for her soon-to-be spouse.
B. A Further Limit on This Proposed Framework: Permitting Only
the Actor to Sue
Using the NIED bystander framework to define the scope of the
third-party retaliation doctrine could go a long way toward balancing the
desire to prevent employers from engaging in third-party retaliation,
while still imposing reasonable limits on the scope of this doctrine.
However, in addition to applying the NIED bystander framework to
these claims, courts should adopt an additional step to define the scope
of the third-party retaliation doctrine. Specifically, courts should
mandate that only the Actor—the party who actually engaged in some
protected activity—will have the power to bring a third-party retaliation
claim. The party who merely was the Target of the employer’s
subsequent ire, but who did not personally engage in any protected
activity, should not be permitted to sue.
Admittedly, the Supreme Court expressly rejected this approach in
its recent Thompson decision. In analyzing the provision of Title VII that
provides that a “civil action may be brought . . . by the person claiming to
124
be aggrieved,” the Court held that being a “person . . . aggrieved”
125
required something more than mere Article III standing. However, the
Court declined to adopt North American’s view that a
“person . . . aggrieved” for purposes of this provision could be only the
individual who engaged in protected activity, finding no basis in the text

121. See Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., 283 F.3d 561, 564 (3d Cir. 2002).
122. See Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1225 (5th Cir. 1996).
123. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 868 (2011). (“We think it obvious that a
reasonable worker might be dissuaded from engaging in protected activity if she knew that her fiancé
would be fired.”); see also Temm, supra note 11, at 889–91 (asserting that a deterrent effect may exist,
but should not be presumed to exist, where the Actor and Target are engaged to be married).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2010).
125. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. at 869–70.
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of the statute or in the Court’s past practice for construing this phase in
126
this manner. Rather, the Court interpreted this “person . . . aggrieved”
limitation using its “zone of interests” doctrine—a doctrine commonly
127
applied in administrative law. In essence, this doctrine will bar a
plaintiff from suing if her “interests are so marginally related to or
inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot
128
reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” In
other words, in applying this “zone of interests” doctrine, a court will ask
itself whether a particular plaintiff falls within the class of individuals
whom Congress intended to protect when it enacted a particular statute.
Applying the “zone of interests” doctrine to the circumstances here, the
Court held that a plaintiff should be able to bring a third-party retaliation
claim if she has an interest that Congress arguably sought to protect in
129
enacting Title VII. According to the Court, Thompson fell into that
category, because (1) he was an employee of North American, (2) the
purpose of Title VII was to protect employees from unlawful action by
employers, and (3) North American intended to harm Regalado, the
130
Actor, by taking action against Thompson here.
While the Supreme Court’s holding in this respect is appealing in its
simplicity, the Court’s argument ignores various nuances regarding the
nature of a Title VII retaliation claim and the impact this holding could
have on employers more generally. In fact, several justifications would
support holding that third-party retaliation claims, while permissible,
should be brought only by the party who actually engaged in protected
activity and not by the non-Actor “Target” of the employer’s retaliation.
First, mandating that only the Actor can bring a third-party
retaliation claim would be consistent with the purpose of the retaliation
doctrine more generally. As previously noted, Congress included this
prohibition on retaliation within Title VII to ensure that employees
131
would not be chilled in exercising their rights under Title VII. In
application, however, Congress’s mission seems to have been interpreted
somewhat more specifically. Title VII does not bar employers from
engaging in any “retaliatory” action in response to employee protected
activity. Rather, the Supreme Court has made clear that section 704(a)
bars “only those [actions] which courts believe would chill a reasonable
132
Specifically, a
person from coming forward with a complaint.”
126. See id. at 869.
127. See id. at 869–70.
128. Id. at 870 (quoting Clark v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 338, 399–400 (1987)).
129. Id. (quoting Clark, 479 U.S. at 399–400).
130. Id.
131. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
132. Deborah L. Brake, Perceiving Subtle Sexism: Mapping the Social-Psychological Forces and
Legal Narratives that Obscure Gender Bias, 16 Colum. J. Gender & L. 679, 718 (2007) (footnote
omitted); see also Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 61 (2006) (“The anti-retaliation
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retaliation plaintiff “must show that a reasonable employee would have
found the challenged action materially adverse, which . . . means it well
might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
133
charge of discrimination.” In describing the purpose and scope of
section 704(a) in this manner, the Supreme Court seems to support the
idea that Congress’s primary concern in enacting this law was with
protecting the rights of the employee who actually engaged in protected
activity and ensuring that she is not deterred from pursuing this behavior,
as opposed to protecting the rights of those employees who might be
134
associated with this Actor. Congress wanted to protect the individuals
who actually object to perceived discriminatory conduct in the
workplace.
Notably, while the purpose of Title VII’s retaliation provision may
be to encourage individuals to report workplace discrimination, in reality
employees frequently decide whether or not to come forward with these
135
types of concerns only after weighing the costs and benefits of doing so.
An Actor will engage in protected activity only if she thinks that the
136
potential benefits outweigh the potential costs to her. These costs could
include not only the harm suffered by the Actor personally, but also the
harm to her friends and coworkers in the workplace. In other words, an
employee may decide not to report workplace discrimination if she
believes that her employer will respond by taking negative action against
one of her coworkers. The Actor is the one who will make this
calculation—who will decide whether or not to come forward with
concerns about discrimination, based in part upon how she thinks her
employer may react. Accordingly, it makes sense to let the Actor bring a
third-party retaliation claim when an employer does respond adversely
to the Actor’s behavior, since the Actor is the one whose protected
137
activity the courts want to encourage.
In addition, allowing the Actor to bring the third-party retaliation
claim reflects the social reality that the Actor may need this type of legal
protection to a far greater degree than the Target. A wealth of social
science evidence has demonstrated that individuals who complain of
discrimination suffer a broad range of negative consequences, both

provision protects an individual not from all retaliation, but from retaliation that produces an injury or
harm.”).
133. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 63 (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir.
2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. See supra notes 21–25 and accompanying text.
135. See Brake, supra note 10, at 36–37.
136. See id.
137. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 816 (6th Cir. 2009) (arguing that barring
Thompson (the “Target”) from suing under section 704(a) would “not undermine the anti-retaliation
provision’s purpose because retaliation is still actionable, but only in a suit by a primary actor who
engaged in protected activity” (emphasis added)).
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internally and externally. Complaining about discrimination can threaten
an individual’s sense of control and invulnerability, undermining her belief
139
that the world is a “just place.” The tendency for employees who are
exposed to discrimination—particularly women and racial minorities—is
to “look inward and blame themselves” for unfair treatment, rather than
140
Moreover, a
to attribute a negative situation to discrimination.
significant body of social science evidence has documented the severe
social penalties incurred by individuals who complain about
141
Indeed, those who do step forward to report
discrimination.
discrimination often find themselves labeled as “troublemakers” or as
142
“hypersensitive”—even when discrimination has, in fact, occurred. In
this way, an Actor may suffer significant social and psychological costs
from engaging in protected activity, even when she was justified in taking
this step. In the wake of this protected activity, the Actor may experience
the ire of her employer, hostility from other coworkers, and internal
doubts about engaging in this behavior.
Thus, there are significant pressures, both internal and external, that
may prevent individuals from reporting workplace discrimination. Even
for an employee who fervently believes she has suffered from workplace
discrimination, the decision to step forward and expose this illegality may
be rife with conflict. Accordingly, this potential Actor may need some
extra assurance that reporting will be the right move. She may need the
additional comfort of knowing that, in the event of any negative
ramifications from her employer following this report, she will have the
option to sue: that even if the employer’s adverse action is directed at
some third party, the Actor will be able to respond to this adverse action.
For an employee wrestling with how to respond to perceived workplace
discrimination—worrying about how her employer or coworkers will
respond to this charge—simply knowing that another employee might be
able to sue if the employer retaliates against some third party might not
be sufficient comfort. Only by keeping the cause of action with the
individual who engages in the protected activity do we sufficiently
encourage such Actors to step forward.
By holding that only the Actor can sue, the Court would strike the
proper balance between discouraging employers from engaging in this
type of indirect retaliation, while providing employers with sufficient
certainty regarding the legal landscape to allow them to make important
business decisions. An employer engaging in third-party retaliation
would remain liable under Title VII. However, rather than face an
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

See infra notes 139–43 and accompanying text.
Brake, supra note 10, at 28.
Winslow, supra note 10, at 233.
See Brake, supra note 10, at 32–36.
See id. at 33; see also Fink, supra note 113, at 341; Winslow, supra note 10, at 234.
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endless number of potential lawsuits for every adverse action taken in
the workplace against any individual who has any relationship to an
Actor, the employer simply would face potential suits brought by the
Actor.

III. Addressing Potential Criticisms of This Proposed Framework
Despite the compelling arguments in favor of limiting the thirdparty retaliation doctrine in the manner discussed above, these limits
understandably might raise some concerns among those who support a
different view of this doctrine. In fact, both employers and employees
might raise objections to this proposed framework because while it
potentially limits the scope of the third-party retaliation doctrine in some
contexts—something to which employees might object—it also carves
out areas where third-party retaliation claims clearly would be deemed
viable, to the likely chagrin of many employers. This Part fleshes out
some of the common objections raised in response to the types of limits
articulated above (particularly the requirement that only an Actor can
assert a third-party retaliation claim) and responds to those objections.
A. Will the Requirement That Only an ACTOR Can Assert a ThirdParty Retaliation Claim Create Problems with Respect to the
“Adverse Action” Requirement for Retaliation?
As noted above, in order to prevail in asserting a retaliation claim
under Title VII, a plaintiff typically must show, among other things, that
she suffered from some adverse action, and that this adverse action was
143
causally connected to her engaging in some protected activity.
Accordingly, in order for the Actor to be able to sue for retaliation based
upon adverse action to a coworker (the Target), an Actor would have to
show that this negative treatment of a coworker also constituted adverse
action as to her. Those opposed to permitting third-party retaliation
claims (that is, employers) may assert that interpreting “adverse action”
in this manner goes beyond the permissible bounds of Title VII
precedent.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court’s own prior retaliation jurisprudence
would support this somewhat expansive interpretation of “adverse
action.” The Court has indicated that courts should define “adverse”
fairly broadly, including in the Court’s recent decision in Burlington
144
Northern. Specifically, in defining what constitutes adverse action for
purposes of a retaliation claim, the Supreme Court has instructed courts
to inquire whether an action is “materially adverse,” meaning that it
“well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
143. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
144. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68–69 (2006).
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supporting a charge of discrimination.” In other words, courts will bar
as retaliatory those actions that chill the types of behavior that Title VII
was designed to protect. Applied to the context of a third-party
retaliation claim, a court would determine whether harm to a Target
could constitute adverse action toward the Actor by asking: “If the Actor
had known that the consequences for her protected activity would be this
negative impact on the employment of her coworker, would she still have
proceeded in the same way? Would she still have filed a charge of
discrimination against the employer, or otherwise objected to
discrimination in the workplace?”
In some third-party retaliation cases, this question will be fairly easy
to answer, as it may be obvious that negative treatment directed toward a
Target would likely alter the conduct of a coworker-Actor. For example,
if Harry Husband and Wendy Wife work for the same employer and
Wendy Wife is demoted after Harry Husband files a discrimination
charge, this demotion readily could be viewed as an adverse action
affecting both Wendy Wife and Harry Husband. Harry Husband likely
would suffer negative financial consequences from Wendy Wife’s
demotion, due to their now reduced overall household income. Harry
Husband also likely would be directly affected by the emotional impact
of Wendy Wife’s demotion, and would play a large role in providing
emotional support to Wendy Wife in the wake of this disappointment.
For these reasons, Wendy Wife’s demotion likely would have the very
chilling effect on Harry Husband that Title VII’s retaliation clause was
designed to prevent. Harry Husband understandably would be less likely
to complain about workplace discrimination if he feared that Wendy
Wife would suffer negative consequences of this nature. Thus, a court
might well view Wendy Wife’s firing as an adverse action to Harry
146
Husband.
Stepping outside of this fairly common sense example—such as
where the Actor and Target are mere workplace friends—it may be more
difficult to see how adverse action directed toward one employee (the
Target) could be seen as adverse action toward the Actor as well. The
impact of this action on the Actor is much less direct. Yet there are
various legal or doctrinal bases upon which courts could rely to deem a
Target’s termination or demotion to be an adverse action with respect to
an Actor.
First, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a general trend of
defining Title VII’s retaliation provision in a rather broad manner in
147
order to effectuate the statute’s remedial purpose. Indeed, in the
145. Id. (quoting Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
146. Of course, Wendy Wife’s firing would remain an adverse action to her as well.
147. See Long, supra note 10, at 947–75; Winslow, supra note 10, at 215; cf. Michael J. Zimmer, A
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Court’s recent decision in Thompson, it reaffirmed this broad view of
Title VII’s retaliation provision, noting that “Title VII’s antiretaliation
provision must be construed to cover a broad range of employer
148
conduct.” This flexible interpretation of the retaliation doctrine has
included adopting a broad definition of “adverse action.” In Burlington
Northern, the Supreme Court held that actionable retaliation would not
be limited to employment-related activities, or to those affecting the
149
terms and conditions of employment. Rather, the Court held that Title
VII’s antiretaliation provision could reach beyond the employee’s
150
workplace. Moreover, the Court defined the types of actions that could
constitute “adverse actions” for purposes of Title VII. While not every
retaliatory action by an employer necessarily would implicate section
704(a), this provision would bar retaliatory actions that “a reasonable
151
employee would have found . . . materially adverse,” meaning that the
conduct “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
152
supporting a charge of discrimination.” In other words, as noted above,
the court will ask whether the employer’s conduct was sufficiently serious
or harmful so as to deter a reasonable employee from engaging in the
type of conduct that Title VII is designed to protect.
Significantly, in examining whether conduct by an employer rises to
this level of deterring an employee from engaging in her Title VII rights,
the courts do not simply ask what the average, “reasonable” employee
would do when faced with certain conduct by an employer. Rather, as
Burlington Northern directs, the courts will examine the employee’s
actions from the perspective of a “reasonable person in the plaintiff’s
153
position, considering all the circumstances.” According to at least one
commentator in this area, this standard “is almost certainly broad
enough to include a situation in which an employer discharged or
otherwise took action against a friend or loved one of a party who had
154
opposed discrimination in the workplace,” because the knowledge that
an employer would take such action against a friend or loved one “would
undoubtedly dissuade many reasonable employees from making or
155
supporting a charge of discrimination.”

Pro-Employee Supreme Court?: The Retaliation Decisions, 60 S.C. L. Rev. 917, 918 (2009) (asserting
that the Supreme Court has adopted a pro-employee stance in retaliation cases by adopting a
“pragmatic” approach to judicial decisionmaking in such cases).
148. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 864 (2011).
149. Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 53–54 (2006).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 68.
152. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
153. Id. at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Long, supra note 10, at 980.
155. Id.
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In this vein, while the full Sixth Circuit rejected the plaintiff’s thirdparty retaliation claim in Thompson, one concurring judge emphatically
supported the notion that the plaintiff could have brought suit against
North American based upon the company’s termination of her fiancé,
observing that “[i]n my view, ‘discrimination against’ an employee may
include hurting that employee’s relative or friend, and imposing such a
hurt would be unlawful if it is imposed ‘because [the employee] has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice [under
156
Title VII].’” Thus, this judge opined that “[the] defendant’s termination
of Thompson potentially could be deemed an ‘adverse employment
157
action against her.’” In this judge’s view, a reasonable employee might
well be dissuaded from engaging in protected activity if she knew that
such conduct would bring negative consequences in the workplace for
her beloved fiancé.
Social science evidence also supports viewing negative conduct
directed toward a Target not only as adverse action to that employee, but
also as adverse action with respect to an Actor. Professor Cynthia
Estlund has described the extent to which working together as part of the
158
same team can heighten feelings of interconnectedness and loyalty.
According to Estlund, “we spend much of our time in a social
environment that, to varying degrees, is governed by norms of civility
and reciprocity and fosters experiences of cooperation and feelings of
159
solidarity, trust, and mutual responsibility.” Our workplace becomes a
minicommunity, with its own powerful set of rules and relationships.
Therefore, Estlund observes, “working together in this environment also
engenders personal feelings of affection, sympathy, empathy, and
160
Rather than working as isolated
friendship among coworkers.”
automatons, holding each other at arms’ length, the modern workplace
can foster significant positive relationships and emotions among
employees. If Estlund’s observations are true, then they support the idea
that harm to one employee in a workplace also might cause harm to
others in the workplace—particularly those who are related or who share
an especially close relationship. Adverse action toward one employee
could breach this sense of community, causing pain to other employees
who have ties to the harmed individual. The adverse action to one
individual may be experienced by many others.

156. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 816 (6th Cir. 2009) (Rogers, J., concurring)
(citation omitted).
157. Id.
158. Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 Geo.
L.J. 1, 9 (2000); see also Long, supra note 10, at 965.
159. Estlund, supra note 158, at 12.
160. Id.
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B. What If the Actor Does Not Want to Sue?
In addition to concerns about stretching the definition of “adverse
action,” another potential criticism of allowing only the Actor to bring a
third-party retaliation claim involves whether one can be sure that an
Actor would pursue this type of claim. According to the framework
advocated in this Article, the Target of an employer’s retaliatory
behavior—the individual who actually has suffered from some concrete
harm, and thus likely has the most obvious incentive to sue—would be
barred from bringing a third-party retaliation claim. Rather, she would
have to rely upon the Actor to bring this claim. Yet those who support
permitting (and expanding) the third-party retaliation doctrine (that is,
employees) might wonder how we can be sure that an Actor will go to
the trouble of suing. While this might not be an issue in some scenarios,
such as where the Actor and Target are spouses or parent and child, it
might be difficult to persuade other Actors to sue—such as where the
Target is a mere workplace friend or casual acquaintance of the Actor.
Few Actors might be willing to undertake the rigors of litigation out of a
mere altruistic concern for the coworker who was harmed as a result of
161
Thus, a significant aspect of the
the Actor’s protected activity.
framework proposed herein involves motivating Actors to bring these
retaliation claims.
Without a doubt, the most effective way of encouraging an Actor to
sue based upon harm done to a Target would be to allow the Actor to
receive some tangible benefit from the suit. While an Actor’s options
might be fairly limited in this respect—indeed, the Actor may have
suffered minimal damages herself as a result of adverse action directed
toward the Target—some Actors might be able to assert claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress based upon an employer’s
unlawful retaliation toward a Target. In Gore v. Trustees of Deerfield
Academy, for example, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant, an
independent secondary school where the plaintiff had worked, denied
admission to the plaintiff’s daughter in retaliation for the plaintiff’s
162
complaints regarding unlawful discrimination. In response to this
alleged retaliation directed at plaintiff’s daughter, the plaintiff claimed
163
personal damages for emotional distress. The court permitted this claim
to proceed, finding a link between the plaintiff’s complaints and the
defendant’s denial of admission to the plaintiff’s daughter sufficient to

161. Justice Scalia seemed to recognize this potential problem during the oral arguments in
Thompson, asking—in a somewhat different context than that raised by a third-party retaliation
claim—“why would [an Actor] bring a lawsuit if these people really are nothing to her? She just has a
guilt of conscience or something? I mean, I don’t see why she would bring the lawsuit. If it was her
fiancée, maybe, but this . . . .” Thompson Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 14, at 31–32.
162. 385 F. Supp. 2d 65, 66–67, 70 (D. Mass. 2005).
163. Id. at 70.
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withstand the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Thus, while
the bulk of the damages associated with a third-party retaliation claim
likely would go to the Target who suffered adverse action, an Actor
potentially could receive her own monetary recovery if the facts of the
165
case supported awarding emotional distress damages to the Actor.
Even without a financial stake in the outcome of a retaliation suit,
however, an Actor still likely would proceed with a third-party
retaliation claim in most cases (at least, in those cases that would pass
muster under the NIED bystander framework). Under this framework,
as noted above, courts would examine the spatial distance between the
166
Actor and Target; the time lag between the Actor’s protected activity
167
and the Target’s receipt of adverse action; and the relationship
168
between the Target and Actor. Each of these criteria might play a role
in encouraging an Actor to bring such a claim. For example, an Actor
who worked in close spatial proximity with a Target—such as one who
worked on the same team as the Target and/or frequently collaborated
with the Target—likely would experience greater personal ire upon
learning of the Target’s termination or demotion. This Actor therefore
would be more likely to sue. Similarly, an Actor who discovered that a
Target was fired within hours of the employer learning of the Actor’s
protected activity might more readily shoulder responsibility for this
unfortunate result and might feel compelled to help alleviate this burden
by bringing a suit. Finally, an Actor with close relational proximity to a
Target, such as the Target’s spouse or immediate family member,
certainly would be hard-pressed to sit idly by in the wake of a loved one’s
adverse treatment at work. A proper application of the NIED bystander
factors would mean that Actors whose claims could satisfy this
framework likely would not need much encouragement to sue; they
would be those Actors with the closest links to the adverse action in the
first place.
In this respect, the concern about the Actor’s reluctance to sue
might “prove too much” in many cases. As noted above, the Supreme
Court has held that an “adverse action” for purposes of the retaliation
doctrine is one that would dissuade a reasonable worker in the plaintiff’s

164. Id. at 73–74. Significant to the court’s ruling, however, was the fact that the defendant had
presumed for purposes of the summary judgment motion a causal connection between the plaintiff’s
protected activity and the defendant’s denial of admission to the plaintiff’s daughter.
165. In addition, jurisdictions seeking to encourage Actors to sue could enhance the financial
incentives for Actors to do so by enacting legislation that would permit individuals to act as “private
attorneys general” with respect to employer retaliation, whereby such individuals could collect some
portion of any damages, fines, or penalties that result from a successful suit. For an example of such
legislation, see Cal. Lab. Code §§ 2698–2699 (2010).
166. See supra notes 86–89 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
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position from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. The
Actor must perceive some harm before she can claim to have suffered
retaliation by an employer. Accordingly, the argument that an Actor
might need to be persuaded to sue based upon an alleged harm to a
coworker undercuts the notion that the Actor has been harmed by this
conduct. In other words, an Actor who lacks the motivation to object to
harm to a coworker arguably would not have changed her own behavior
as a result of such conduct—including her decision to engage in
170
protected activity in the first place.
The point is that it might not be necessary to find a financial
incentive to encourage Actors to sue for harms done to Targets. The
bystander framework may create equally powerful incentives that will
motivate Actors to litigate these claims. By using the factors discussed
above to require various types of closeness between the Actor and the
Target, the bystander framework attempts to ensure that those Actors
who have sufficient ties to Targets will pursue third-party retaliation
171
claims.
C. Assuming That the Actor Does Sue, Can the Actor Obtain
Adequate Relief for the Target?
An additional critique of allowing only the Actor to bring a thirdparty retaliation claim involves the relief available to the Actor who
brings such a suit. Those opposed to implementing this type of limit on
who can sue (again, employees) might question whether the Actor will
be able to secure meaningful relief for the Target who has been fired,
demoted, or has had her pay cut. Thompson’s attorney made this very
assertion during oral arguments before the Supreme Court: When asked
why Regalado had not brought the claim in this case, Thompson’s
attorney cited the concern that “this Court’s Article III jurisprudence

169. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
170. Moreover, even if an Actor declined to sue based upon adverse action to the Target, the
EEOC still could bring a retaliation claim here. Title VII not only authorizes private individuals to sue
based upon perceived violations of this statute, but also permits the EEOC to bring its own suits and
to seek a broad range of relief, including injunctions, reinstatement, back pay, compensatory damages,
and punitive damages. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 286 (2001) (noting that
Congress amended Title VII in 1972 to authorize the EEOC to bring its own actions, and observing
that those amendments “created a system in which the EEOC was intended to bear the primary
burden of litigation”); see also EEOC, Compliance Manual, supra note 30, § 2-V(C) (“An EEOC
Commissioner may file a charge with the Commission under Title VII or the ADA”). Many Actors
who might be reluctant to engage in full-blown litigation likely would be much more willing simply to
notify the EEOC of concerns regarding unlawful retaliation, presumably allowing the EEOC to take
on the litigation if it found sufficient evidence of third-party retaliation.
171. In addition, as discussed further below, in many cases a Target may be able to bring her own
retaliation suit based upon the Target’s own protected activity. See infra notes 187–94 and
accompanying text.
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would have precluded her from getting any remedy.” While such
concerns are not entirely unfounded, the Actor should be able to make
the Target whole in most cases.
Perhaps the most obvious remedy that many Targets would desire
(at least, those who have been terminated or demoted due to a friend or
family member’s protected activity) would be reinstatement to their
previous positions. Therefore, one might question whether an Actor
suing for third-party retaliation could obtain this type of relief for a
Target: whether the Actor could seek the reinstatement or promotion of
someone else. In fact, there is a strong basis for permitting Actors to
obtain this type of relief under Title VII itself. The very text of the
statute authorizes a court in a Title VII case to award “such affirmative
action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to,
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back pay,” as well
173
as “any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.” The
Supreme Court has stated that a central purpose of Title VII is “to make
persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment
174
discrimination.” Thus, the Court has held that this remedial language
within Title VII grants the federal courts “broad equitable discretion” to
175
take appropriate steps to remedy workplace discrimination. Certainly,
a court exercising this broad statutory discretion could order relief not
just for the Actor-plaintiff, but also for the Target who suffered adverse
action. Moreover, as various courts have observed, reinstatement, where
176
feasible, is the preferred equitable remedy under Title VII. Thus,
courts should be particularly willing to order the reinstatement of an
employee who was terminated due to a coworker’s protected activity.
Case law under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)
provides further support for allowing an Actor-plaintiff to obtain relief
172. Thompson Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 14, at 4–5; see Thompson v. N. Am.
Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 822 n.5 (6th Cir. 2009) (Moore, J., dissenting) (“Regalado’s ability to sue in
this matter does not solve the instant problem because the relief Regalado would be able to seek
would appear to differ substantially from the relief that Thompson can seek . . . .”); see also Long,
supra note 10, at 980 (questioning whether a suit by the Actor could obtain appropriate relief for a
Target in most cases).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2010).
174. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
175. Franks v. Bowen Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1951) (citations omitted); see id. (examining
legislative history of Title VII and finding “emphatic confirmation that federal courts are empowered
to fashion such relief as the particular circumstances of a case may require to effect restitution”); see
also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae on Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, 12, Thompson v.
N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863 (2011) (No. 09-291), 2010 WL 2101919 at *1, *12 (“[I]f Regalado
had brought such a suit and established a violation, the district court could have used its broad
equitable power to fashion an appropriate remedy, which could have included recompense for
[Thompson].”).
176. See, e.g., Valentin-Almeyda v. Mun. of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 105 (1st Cir. 2006); Bruso v.
United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d 848, 861 (7th Cir. 2001); Caudle v. Bristow Optical Co., 224 F.3d 1014,
1020 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Long, supra note 10, at 981.
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for a third-party Target. The Supreme Court has indicated that
jurisprudence developed under the NLRA can serve as a guide for
177
interpreting remedies under Title VII as well. Under the NLRA,
supervisory employees are not deemed “employees” entitled to
178
protection under the statute. Yet where an employer has terminated a
supervisory employee in retaliation for a family member’s protected
union activities, the courts consistently have supported the National
Labor Relations Board’s decision to award reinstatement or other
179
appropriate relief to this supervisory employee. As one court observed:
While it is uncontestably true that the Act does not protect a
supervisor from being discharged for engaging in concerted activity,
this does not deprive the [National Labor Relations] Board of the
authority to order the reinstatement of a supervisor whose firing
resulted not from her own pro-union conduct, but from the employer’s
efforts to thwart the exercise of section 7 rights by protected rank-and180
file employees.

In other words, even though supervisory employees—like the Target in a
third-party retaliation case—would not otherwise be protected under the
relevant statute, they can receive relief from the court.
Providing relief to the otherwise unprotected supervisory employee
in the NLRA context serves a similar purpose to that which allows an
Actor to obtain relief for a Target in a third-party retaliation case. In the
NLRA context, one court observed that reinstating the supervisory
employee would protect the rights of covered, nonsupervisory employees
“by assuring them that they need not fear that the exercise of their rights
181
will give the company a license to inflict harm on their family.” The
same argument could apply under Title VII’s retaliation provision:
Allowing the restatement of the Target in a suit by an Actor ensures
other employees that their employer will not have free reign to respond
to their protected activity actions by retaliating against friends and family
in the workplace.
During the oral argument in Thompson, Justice Breyer challenged
the idea that Regalado (the Actor) could not obtain relief for Thompson
(the Target) via her own retaliation suit:

177. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 226 n.8 (1982) (“The principles developed
under the NLRA generally guide, but do not bind, courts in tailoring remedies under Title VII.”
(citation omitted)); see also Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate:
Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII , 63 Vand. L. Rev. 363, 431 (2010).
178. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2010).
179. See Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 400, 407 (3d Cir. 1990) (listing cases in
which courts have recognized the power of the National Labor Relations Board to order the
reinstatement of a supervisor discharged due to the protected activities of nonsupervisory employees).
180. Id. at 406.
181. Id. at 409.
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Why couldn’t she bring this suit? And she says, I was discriminated
against because they did A, B, C, D to him, and the remedy is, cure the
way in which I was discriminated against. And to cure that way, you
would have to make the man whole in respect to those elements that
we’re discriminating against.
Do you give him back pay? Do you restore him? You do everything
you would normally have to do because otherwise, she is suffering the
kind of injury, though it was to him, that amounts to discrimination for
182
opposing a practice. What’s wrong with that theory?

Drawing analogies to trust law, Justice Breyer inquired, “[I]f you’re
a trustee, you certainly can sue to get the beneficiary put back. There are
dozens of cases where you can sue to get somebody else paid back
183
money, and—and why isn’t this one of them?”
Thus, there is a strong basis for finding that an Actor who brings a
third-party retaliation claim could obtain relief for a Target. However, an
additional layer of protection exists for Targets in these cases: If a Target
is not satisfied with the relief that an Actor obtains in her third-party
retaliation suit, the Target in most cases may be able to bring a
retaliation suit of her own. As noted above, most Targets will experience
adverse treatment in the workplace not only because of some passive
184
relationship to the protected activity of a coworker. Rather, most
Targets will have played some active role in the coworker’s protected
activity, whether by assisting in the filing of the Actor’s discrimination
185
charge or participating in the investigation or litigation of that charge.
As the Sixth Circuit recently noted in its decision in Thompson,
“Congress may have thought that friends or relatives who would be at
risk of retaliation typically would have participated in some manner in
186
the protected discrimination charge.”
The Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Metropolitan
Government of Nashville and Davidson County supports the ability of a
third party to bring her own direct retaliation suit in these
187
circumstances. Crawford established a fairly loose standard regarding
what will constitute a “protected activity” for purposes of section 704(a),
stating that “opposition” for purposes of section 704(a) need not involve
188
active and consistent instigating behavior by an employee. Rather, an
employee may oppose discrimination for purposes of section 704(a)

182. Thompson Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 14, at 13.
183. Id. at 14; see also George Gleason Bogert & George Taylor Bogert, The Law of Trusts and
Trustees § 869 (2d ed. 1995) (“Although the beneficiary is adversely affected by such acts of a third
person, no cause of action inures to him on that account. The right to sue in the ordinary case vests in
the trustee as representative.” (footnote omitted)).
184. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
186. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 811 (6th Cir. 2009).
187. 129 S. Ct. 846, 850 (2009).
188. Id. at 851–52.
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merely by participating in an employer’s internal investigation of
discrimination allegations, such as by responding to questions regarding
189
such alleged workplace discrimination. While the Court’s willingness to
extend this holding to other scenarios of passive opposition or
190
participation remains unclear, Crawford indicates some flexibility on
the part of the Court in its interpretation of what constitutes “protected
191
activity” for purposes of Title VII.
Indeed, under the facts of Thompson itself, Thompson may have
been able to bring his own direct retaliation claim. Thompson apparently
“helped [Regalado] synthesize her experiences for the EEOC
investigator and shared his perspective when the investigator questioned
192
him about [Regalado’s] complaint.” He also sent a memo to both his
and Regalado’s supervisors, in which he appeared to have included
complaints regarding the alleged discrimination that Regalado was
193
experiencing at work. In this light, Thompson’s failure to bring a direct
retaliation claim—one based upon his own protected activity—seems
curious to say the least. Thus, the scenario alleged in Thompson—where
an individual with close ties to a victim of workplace discrimination had
no involvement in the discrimination allegations of her spouse or parent
or (as here) fiancé—may in fact be relatively rare. Rather than
representing a pervasive gap in the coverage of Title VII, perhaps
Thompson stemmed from little more than sloppy pleading by
194
Thompson’s attorney.

Conclusion: The Future of Third-Party Retaliation Claims
in a Post-THOMPSON World
While the Supreme Court has provided lower courts with some
much-needed guidance regarding the viability of the third-party
retaliation doctrine generally, the Court in Thompson failed to fully
articulate the scope of this doctrine and failed to place proper limits on
this doctrine. To be sure, the Court provided additional protection to
employees who wish to assert their rights under federal antidiscrimination

189. See id. at 851–53.
190. See Winslow, supra note 10, at 221 n.46.
191. But see Long, supra note 10, at 953–54, 986–87 (discussing challenges of asserting retaliation
under Title VII’s “opposition clause”). Accordingly, Professor Long argues for a broader reading of
section 704(a)’s participation clause, proposing that “[t]he concept of assistance should not be limited
to situations in which an employee provides active assistance in an investigation . . .” and that “subtle
words of encouragement and assurances of support” should qualify as assistance for purposes of Title
VII. Id. at 986.
192. Thompson Plaintiff’s Memorandum, supra note 114 (citations omitted).
193. See id.
194. In addition, depending on the facts of a particular case or on the laws in the relevant
jurisdiction, there might be other claims that a Target could bring besides a Title VII retaliation claim,
such as a common law wrongful discharge claim.
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laws—a laudable and important goal. Its decision properly closed a
potential loophole in previously existing federal antiretaliation
jurisprudence, making clear that just as employers cannot take action
directly against an employee for engaging in protected activity, so too are
employers barred from getting back at an employee by harming those in
the workplace with whom that employee is close.
Yet the Court failed to balance these important protections for
employees against the legitimate concerns of employers. Particularly,
employers’ fears that any adverse action taken in the wake of this
decision, against any employee in the workplace, could create exposure
to liability under the third-party retaliation doctrine, even if the Target of
the adverse action has never engaged personally in protected activity,
and even if she has a fairly attenuated relationship with a coworker who
195
has engaged in protected activity.
Much of the concern that employers might harbor in this respect
stems from the gaping hole in the Supreme Court’s decision regarding
how lower courts should apply this analysis. While this Article does not
advocate that the Court should have articulated some comprehensive list
of the types of claims that will qualify for protection under the thirdparty retaliation doctrine, it does assert that lower courts should be given
a more detailed framework regarding the factors to be used in
conducting this analysis (in other words, the NIED bystander factors).
Moreover, this Article asserts that the Court could have tempered the
anxiety among employers about exposure in this area by limiting the
class of plaintiffs who are able to sue (that is, by only allowing Actors to
sue). The Court’s failure to adopt either of these approaches may have
significant implications for future third-party retaliation cases, as well as
for employers more generally.
First, as noted above, while the Court made clear that Title VII will
protect against third-party retaliation in some circumstances, the Court
was surprisingly vague regarding what those circumstances might be.
While the Court outlined the outer bounds of this decision, specifying
that the doctrine almost always will cover retaliation against the
coworker-spouse of an employee who engages in protected activity and
196
likely will not cover a reprisal on a mere workplace friend, the decision
opened a wide gulf between these two extremes, into which many
situations might fall. As one attorney-blogger observed in the wake of
this decision, the doctrine covers “[s]ome people sometimes and other
197
people other times. Sorry employers, it depends on the circumstances.”
195. Indeed, the Court has been criticized more broadly for its failure to provide sufficient
guidance to lower courts in a broad range of decisions. See Adam Liptak, Justices Long on Words but
Short on Guidance, N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 2010, at A1.
196. See Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 863 (2011).
197. Philip Miles, SCOTUS Decides “Fire the Fiance” 3rd Party Retaliation, Lawffice Space (Jan.
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In the words of another observer: “The details of how this all works? The
practical, decision-making paradigm for employers dealing daily in the
198
trenches with these issues? It’s anybody’s guess.” While the criticisms
of internet bloggers may represent little more than the unregulated (and
often self-serving) rants of those who disagree with the Court’s
reasoning, the underlying premise of these complaints has significant
merit. Instead of fully resolving the ambiguity that for years has plagued
courts faced with third-party retaliation claims, the Court’s decision
merely resolved one small part of this complex inquiry.
This vagueness in the Court’s opinion is not without consequences.
As previously noted, retaliation claims already outnumber other Title
199
VII complaints with respect to filings with the EEOC, and the
200
prevalence of these claims seems to be on the rise. While third-party
retaliation claims likely make up a small fraction of retaliation claims
generally (precise statistics on this point not being readily available),
third-party retaliation claims likely will increase in the wake of this
decision, due to the absence of clear guidance from the Court regarding
the outer boundaries of this doctrine. Indeed, without any clear limits
here, an employer may face liability (or, at a minimum, costly litigation)
for third-party retaliation upon taking adverse action against any
employee with the slightest connection to a coworker who previously
201
engaged in protected activity. And, given that the Supreme Court has
made the viability of this claim a factual issue—one that will “depend
202
upon the particular circumstances” of a case —employers will be hard
pressed to resolve even the most seemingly preposterous of third-party
claims via an early motion to dismiss. Rather, employers will have to
litigate these claims at least through summary judgment, an expensive
203
and time-consuming undertaking for both employers and the courts. In
other words, even if viable third-party retaliation claims make up a small
minority of courts’ dockets going forward, employers may be forced to

24, 2011, 10:35 P.M.), http://www.lawfficespace.com.
198. Greenberg Traurig, Supreme Court Finds That Employee Who Did Not Engage in Protected
Activity Under Title VII Is Still Protected by Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Prohibition, GT L&E Blog
(Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.gtleblog.com/2011/01/articles/legislation/supreme-court-finds-that-employeewho-did-not-engage-in-protected-activity-under-title-vii-is-still-protected-by-title-viis-antiretaliationprohibition/.
199. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text.
200. See supra notes 11–14 and accompanying text.
201. See Amy Joseph Pedersen, Supreme Court Holds Title VII Can Cover Third Party Retaliation
Claims, Stoel Rives World Emp. (Jan. 24, 2011), http://www.stoelrivesworldofemployment.com
(“Employers probably didn’t need another reminder that the potential claims they face are only
limited by the imagination of plaintiffs’ attorneys.”).
202. Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 131 S. Ct. 863, 863 (2011) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa
Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 69 (2006)).
203. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (describing the exorbitant cost of litigating Title
VII claims).
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expend vast resources fending off meritless claims of this nature simply
because the Court declined to more clearly define the scope of this
doctrine.
Finally, perhaps the most interesting potential effect of the Court’s
decision in this case involves its potential to impact employee privacy in a
significant way. As explained in detail above, the Court’s decision in
Thompson means that employers may be liable for taking adverse action
against an employee if the employee has a sufficiently close relationship
204
with a coworker who has engaged in protected activity. As previously
discussed, the reality is that many prudent and risk-averse employers
want to guard against even the potential for liability before taking
adverse action against an employee, even if it remains unclear what types
205
of relationships will support this type of claim. Even where an
employer has perfectly legitimate reasons for firing an employee, the
employer likely will want to know—prior to taking adverse action—what
potential claims the employee can bring in the wake of her termination.
Rather than evidencing some “sinister” motive, this stance merely
reflects the reality that many employees will protest a termination
decision, that such protests often take the form of a lawsuit, and that
even where such suits are ultimately found to lack merit, they may cost
206
an employer tens of thousands of dollars to defend. As Justice Alito
observed during the oral arguments in Thompson (despite ultimately
signing on to the majority’s decision):
Put yourself in the . . . shoes of an employer, and you . . . want to take
an adverse employment action against employee A. You think you
have good grounds for doing that, but you want—before you do it, you
want to know whether you’re potentially opening yourself up to a
retaliation claim.
Now, what is the employer supposed to do then? They say . . . we
need to survey everybody who is engaged in protected conduct, and
now we need to see whether this person who we’re thinking of taking
the adverse employment action against has a . . . “close relationship”
207
with any of those people.

As Justice Alito’s comments imply, a cautious employer may seek to
minimize its liability before firing an employee (or at least to get a handle
on its potential exposure) by thoroughly exploring the relationships
among its employees. While an employee’s membership in other
protected categories typically will be fairly obvious—in most cases, the
employer will know an employee’s race, gender, age, and possibly their
disability status—discovering an employee’s relationships with coworkers

204.
205.
206.
207.

See supra notes 37, 56–58 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
Thompson Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 14, at 17–18.
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will take much more work. Employers will want to know whether an
employee is married to, engaged to, or even dating another employee;
they will want to know whether the employee is the parent, child, or
perhaps more distant relative of another employee; and they may even
want to know whether the employee is close friends with other
employees and may want details regarding the extent of those
208
friendships. At a time when employees increasingly are concerned
about preventing unwarranted intrusions by employers into their private
209
lives, a decision like this could lead to the opposite result.
To be sure, as counsel for Thompson pointed out during oral
arguments in this case, an employer should not be liable for third-party
retaliation under section 704(a) if the employer was not aware of the
210
Target-employee’s relationship with a coworker-Actor. In that vein,
one could argue that an employer need not—and perhaps should not—
make these types of inquiries prior to taking adverse action against an
employee. However, particularly in a large company, it may be difficult
to keep track of whether someone in management might have known
about the Target-employee’s relationship with a coworker-Actor such
that this knowledge could be attributed to the decisionmaker in the
211
Target’s adverse action. Moreover, the mere fact that an employee’s
claim ultimately might fail because an employer can show that it had no
knowledge of the Target’s relationship with the coworker-Actor will not
prevent the employer from having to expend tremendous resources
(financial and otherwise) to establish this point and obtain dismissal of
the claim.
Finally, a further concern is not just what employers may ask in an
effort to limit their exposure in these cases, but also how employers may
try to gather this information. Employers have become increasingly
adept at using technology to gather information about employees, from
using internet sources like Google or Facebook to monitoring employees’
212
use of employer-provided cell phones and computers. Faced with

208. See Greenberg Traurig, supra note 198.
209. See id.
210. See Thompson Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 14, at 19 (“I think if the employer
doesn’t know about the relationship, any allegation like the allegation we have in this case simply isn’t
going to be plausible. It isn’t going to be a plausible contention that there is a relationship between
one employee’s protected activity and an adverse action visited on the plaintiff.”).
211. See EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 484–85 (10th Cir. 2006)
(describing the “cat’s paw” theory of discrimination or retaliation as “a situation in which a biased
subordinate, who lacks decision-making power, uses the formal decision-maker as a dupe in a
deliberate scheme to trigger a discriminatory employment action” (citation omitted)); see also
Thompson Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 14, at 19 (collecting cases applying the “cat’s paw”
theory to Title VII claims).
212. See Jill Schachner Chanen, The Boss Is Watching, 94 A.B.A. J., 48, 49 (2008); see also Andrea
Coombes, Privacy at Work? Don’t Count on It, Marketwatch, (June 23, 2005)
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/e-mail-internet-privacy-at-work-dont-count-on-it.

Fink_20 (J. GRANTZ) (Do Not Delete)

566

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1/24/2012 6:27 PM

[Vol. 63:521

uncertainty regarding the scope of the third-party retaliation doctrine,
employers understandably (and perhaps advisably) may step up this
monitoring. If it is unclear whether co-workers who are mere “Facebook
friends” could serve as Actor and Target in a successful third-party
retaliation claim, then an employer may want to cover its bases by
reviewing all of the Facebook friends of its employees. If the Court has
not indicated the level of contact between an Actor and Target necessary
to support a third-party retaliation claim, then a cautious employer might
want to know the names of all of the coworkers whom an employee
texted in some given period before the employer considers firing that
employee. Such information-gathering measures by employers might
seem extreme, but many employers, faced with uncertainty regarding
their exposure under this evolving third-party retaliation doctrine, might
well choose to take such proactive steps in order to minimize their
potential liability.
The point is not that the Supreme Court “got it wrong” in
Thompson. To the contrary, on the essential question—whether thirdparty retaliation should be barred under Title VII—the Supreme Court
got it just right. However, in refusing to give lower courts more detailed
criteria regarding when the third-party retaliation doctrine will apply, the
Court missed an opportunity to balance the important protections that it
was providing to employees against the realities that employers face
when making difficult but important workplace decisions. This Article
attempts to assist lower courts in finding that balance.

